Elections and electoral control

The following are previously published works on elections and electoral control that have informed our project.  We present this previous research as a resource to scholars interested in the topic of elections and electoral control around the world. The entries are listed in alphabetical order according to the last name of the first author.

Title Putting the Party Back into Politics: An Experiment Testing Whether Election Day Festivals Increase Voter Turnout
Type Journal Article
Author Elizabeth M. Addonizio
Author Donald P. Green
Author James M. Glaser
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1049096507071168
Volume 40
Issue 04
Publication PS: Political Science and Politics
ISSN 1049-0965, 1537-5935
Date 2007-10-3
DOI 10.1017/S1049096507071168
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract What is the marginal effect of competitiveness on the power of electoral incentives? Addressing this question empirically is difficult because challenges to incumbents are endogenous to their behavior in office. To overcome this obstacle, we exploit a unique feature of Kansas courts: 14 districts employ partisan elections to select judges, while 17 employ noncompetitive retention elections. In the latter, therefore, challengers are ruled out.We find judges in partisan systems sentence more severely than those in retention systems. Additional tests attribute this to the incentive effects of potential competition, rather than the selection of more punitive judges in partisan districts.
Title The role of political competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption: The Italian case
Type Journal Article
Author Maria Rosaria Alfano
Author Anna Laura Baraldi
Author Claudia Cantabene
URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/soceco/v47y2013icp1-10.html
Volume 47
Issue C
Pages 1-10
Publication The Journal of Socio-Economics
Date 2013
Abstract The effects of electoral systems on corruption have been widely studied in economic and political literature. However, in explaining this relationship, very little attention has been paid to the role of political competition. We hypothesize that the degree of proportionality of the electoral system has a direct and indirect impact on corruption, via the degree of electoral competition among political parties. The estimated results, on a sample of the 20 Italian regions over 26 years, show that both the direct and the indirect effects are relevant in explaining corruption. As the electoral system becomes more proportional, corruption directly decreases. This beneficial effect can be reinforced or reduced depending on how the variation in political competition follows a variation in the degree of proportionality of the electoral system.
Title Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
Type Journal Article
Author James Altа
Author Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
Author Shanna Rose
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381610000940
Volume 73
Issue 01
Pages 171-186
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2011-1-14
DOI 10.1017/S0022381610000940
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant, differences in performance by reelection-eligible and term-limited incumbents identify an accountability effect: reelection-eligible governors have greater incentives to exert costly effort on behalf of voters. Holding term-limit status constant, differences in performance by incumbents in different terms identify a competence effect: later-term incumbents are more likely to be competent both because they have survived reelection and because they have experience in office. We show that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited incumbents (accountability), and under reelected incumbents than under first-term incumbents (competence), all else equal. In addition to improving our understanding of the role of elections in representative democracy, these findings resolve an empirical puzzle about the disappearance of the effect of term limits on gubernatorial performance over time.
Title Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective
Type Journal Article
Author Christopher J Anderson
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379499000451
Volume 19
Issue 2-3
Pages 151-170
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 6/2000
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00045-1
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Based on individual-level survey data collected in 13 European democracies, this study analyzes three alternative ways of modeling how political context affects the relationship between economic perceptions and vote intention. The three approaches are (1) institutional clarity of responsibility; (2) governing party target size; and (3) clarity of available alternatives. The results reveal that political context interacts with economic perceptions to affect voting behavior. When the institutional context clarifies who is in charge of policymaking, when the target of credit and blame is large, and when citizens have fewer viable alternative choices, economic effects are stronger. Taken together, these findings suggest that voters’ ability to express discontent with economic performance is enhanced when mechanisms of accountability are simple.
Title The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Christopher J. Anderson
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/(…)/annurev.polisci.10.050806.155344
Volume 10
Issue 1
Pages 271-296
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 06/2007
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.050806.155344
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The predominant normative justification for research on economic voting has been its essential role in shaping democratic accountability. A systematic examination of this literature reveals, however, that economic voting is highly contingent on two critical moderating factors: voters themselves and the political context in which they make judgments. The trend toward a better and more realistic understanding of economic voting produced by almost four decades of empirical research has created what I label “contingency dilemmas” for the field’s normative foundations because economic voting does not function as envisioned by advocates of democratic accountability. This essay reviews these empirical findings and critically examines how they affect the economic voting paradigm. It argues that, when viewed from a normative perspective, contingent accountability is clearly problematic, and it calls for a reconsideration of the normative underpinnings of the economic voting paradigm in light of the current state of knowledge.
Title Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis
Type Journal Article
Author Cameron D. Anderson
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00194.x
Volume 50
Issue 2
Pages 449-463
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0092-5853, 1540-5907
Date 04/2006
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00194.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that “clarity of responsibility” within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the “clarity of responsibility” argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.
Title Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author Christopher J. Anderson
Author Yuliya V. Tverdova
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1540-5907.00007
Volume 47
Issue 1
Pages 91-109
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0092-5853, 1540-5907
Date 01/2003
DOI 10.1111/1540-5907.00007
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Using surveys conducted in sixteen mature and newly established democracies around the globe, this study examines the effect of corruption on people’s attitudes toward government. The analysis demonstrates that citizens in countries with higher levels of corruption express more negative evaluations of the performance of the political system and exhibit lower levels of trust in civil servants. However, the results also show that the negative effect of corruption on evaluations of the political system is significantly attenuated among supporters of the incumbent political authorities. These findings provide strong and systematic evidence that informal political practices, especially those that compromise important democratic principles, should be considered important indicators of political system performance. Moreover, they imply that, while corruption is a powerful determinant of political support across widely varying political, cultural, and economic contexts, it does not uniformly diminish support for political institutions across all segments of the electorate.
Title Beyond representativeness? Trends in political representation
Type Journal Article
Author Rudy B. Andeweg
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1062798703000164
Volume 11
Issue 02
Publication European Review
ISSN 1062-7987, 1474-0575
Date 2003-5-20
DOI 10.1017/S1062798703000164
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The ascendancy of proportional representation as the electoral system of choice, and pervasive concerns with the demographic representativeness of parliaments, both testify to the importance that is attached to ‘descriptive’ or ‘microcosmic’ representation in politics, despite persistent doubts about its desirability. This paper makes three points. First, representation as representativeness presupposes the existence of stable and meaningful social or political collectivities, which can be reflected in the composition of parliament, and this condition is undermined by the general trend towards individualization, which can be observed throughout Western Europe. Second, this trend necessitates a conceptualization of political representation not as a state, but as a dynamic relationship between the citizen and the representative. This relationship can be characterized both by its direction (from below or from above), and by the moment at which popular control is exercised (before or after the representative’s period in office). Third, it is argued that both growing uncertainty about citizen preferences and the transformation of political parties into para-statal agencies push towards representation from above; and that both growing unpredictability of the political agenda and European integration push towards ex-post popular control. These developments call for greater attention to mechanisms of accountability in representative democracies.
Title Political Representation
Type Book
Author F. R. Ankersmit
Publisher Stanford University Press
ISBN 9780804739825
Date 2002
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract This ambitious work aims to reintroduce history into political theory. Contemporary political philosophy—liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism—disregards history because it is irrelevant to the nature of politics and to what constitutes a political problem. The author argues that this view reduces politics and political philosophy to a vapid academic game that is insensitive to both the essence and practice of politics. He proposes that an indissoluble link between history and politics lies in the notion of representation. Since history represents the past, and the core of democratic politics resides in political representation, the author sees representation as the common ground of history and politics. He welcomes, analyzes, and elaborates all the aestheticist connotations of representation. The history of Machiavellianism demonstrates how influential the impact of history has been on political thought, ironically resulting in the repression of history from philosophical reflection on the nature of politics. Historicist political philosophy is distinguished from its anti-historicist rival in terms of the distinction between historicist compromise and anti-historicist consensus, as seen in the work of Rawls and Rorty. Compromise is shown to be politically creative and open-minded, whereas consensus is conservative and totalitarian. Finally, the author argues that respect is the supreme democratic virtue, and that historicist political philosophy respects “respect,” while its anti-historicist rival has no rivals between disrespect and indifference.
# of Pages 284
Title Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Type Journal Article
Author Scott Ashworth
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
Volume 15
Issue 1
Pages 183-201
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 2012-06-15
DOI 10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents’ incentives are driven not by the voters’ evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome’s information about the incumbent’s type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.
Title Reputational Dynamics and Political Careers
Type Journal Article
Author S. Ashworth
URL http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewi015
Volume 21
Issue 2
Pages 441-466
Publication Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
ISSN 8756-6222, 1465-7341
Date 2005-08-24
DOI 10.1093/jleo/ewi015
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract I study a model of repeated elections with both symmetric learning about candidate ability and moral hazard. In this model, candidates choose how to allocate their resources between constituency service and policy work. Early in their careers, they devote excessive time to constituency service in an attempt to manipulate voter learning. Since voters use elections to select better candidates, incumbents become more confident of reelection over time and reduce the distortion in their effort allocations. I embed the basic model in a common agency framework to study seniority norms in legislative organization. The model organizes many of the stylized facts about elections and congressional organization, including retrospective voting, the incumbency advantage, the dynamics of effort allocation over a career, the importance of constituency service, and seniority norms in committee assignments.
Title Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage
Type Journal Article
Author Scott Ashworth
Author Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381608081024
Volume 70
Issue 04
Pages 1006
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2008-10-23
DOI 10.1017/S0022381608081024
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We study the comparative statics of the incumbency advantage in a model of electoral selection and strategic challenger entry. The incumbency advantage arises in the model because, on average, incumbents have greater ability than challengers. This is true for two reasons: high-ability candidates are more likely to win election (electoral selection) and high-quality incumbents deter challengers (strategic challenger entry). We show that this quality-based incumbency advantage is expected to be greater for high visibility offices, in polities with relatively small partisan tides, in unpolarized electoral environments, and in electorates that are relatively balanced in their partisan preferences.
Title Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional Settings
Type Journal Article
Author Scott Ashworth
Author Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381600005648
Volume 68
Issue 01
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2008-7-29
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00378.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We analyze a model of legislative particularism to understand how the provision of constituency service responds to variations in institutional and electoral environments. We show that increased partisan balance in the electorate, single-member districts, and independent executives all increase incentives for legislators to provide constituency service. The results of the model are consistent with existing comparative-institutional empirical observations. Moreover, the model addresses over time trends in the United States that are not explained by existing models and yields novel hypotheses that are amenable to empirical evaluation.
Title Does informative media commentary reduce politicians’ incentives to pander?
Type Journal Article
Author Scott Ashworth
Author Kenneth W. Shotts
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0047272710000782
Volume 94
Issue 11-12
Pages 838-847
Publication Journal of Public Economics
ISSN 00472727
Date 12/2010
DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.013
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices. We show that, although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent’s incentive to pander, in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse. Furthermore, in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a “yes man”—suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice. We explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters’ tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent, based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies.
Title Credible debate equilibria
Type Journal Article
Author D. Austen-Smith
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF01832923
Volume 7
Issue 1
Pages 75-93
Publication Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN 0176-1714, 1432-217X
Date 3/1990
DOI 10.1007/BF01832923
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Legislation is not an end in itself, but means to an end. Unfortunately, the technical relationship connecting any legislation to real consequences is rarely known for sure. In debate, legislators have an opportunity to persuade others of the relative value of particular bills, to influence the substance of the agenda, and to affect voting decisions. Since preferences over consequences are typically taken to be fixed, such persuasion etc. necessarily amounts to changing beliefs over the likely effects of various alternative bills. The extent to which debate can be effective in altering others’ beliefs depends on how audiences interpret and assimilate any information speechmakers volunteer. This paper considers one plausible approach to credibility in debate. Debate is modeled as a cheap talk stage preceding an endogenous agenda setting game under incomplete information. In this framework, the issue can be formulated in terms of what constitutes an equilibrium. It is demonstrated that a fairly weak and intuitively plausible criterion of credibility effectively leads to there being little opportunity for credible transmission of information in debate.
Title Eastern Europe in revolution
Type Book
Author Ivo Banac
Publisher Cornell University Press
ISBN 9780801427114
Date 1992
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 280
Title A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces
Type Journal Article
Author Jeffrey S. Banks
URL http://www.qjps.com/prod.aspx?product=QJPS&doi=100.00006009
Volume 3
Issue 3
Pages 269-299
Publication Quarterly Journal of Political Science
ISSN 15540634
Date 2008-10-26
DOI 10.1561/100.00006009
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple” voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient.
Title A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
Type Journal Article
Author Jeffrey S Banks
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0022053190900055
Volume 50
Issue 2
Pages 309-325
Publication Journal of Economic Theory
ISSN 00220531
Date 4/1990
DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract A model of two-candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected. Candidates simultaneously announce policy positions, from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt. Announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate, with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases. A refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters.
Title Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
Type Book
Author Benjamin R. Barber
Publisher University of California Press
ISBN 9780520242333
Date 2003
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Since its appearance twenty years ago, Benjamin R. Barber’s Strong Democracy has been one of the primary standards against which political science thinking and writing is measured. Defined as the participation of all of the people in at least some aspects of self-government at least some of the time, Strong Democracy offers liberal society a new way of thinking about and of practicing democracy. Contrary to the commonly held view that an excess of democracy can undo liberal institutions, Barber argues that an excess of liberalism has undermined our democratic institutions and brought about the set of crises we still find ourselves struggling against: cynicism about voting, alienation, privatization, and the growing paralysis of public institutions. In a new preface Barber looks at the past twenty years and restates his argument, which seems, sadly, more pressing than ever.
# of Pages 372
Title A Right to Representation: Proportional Election Systems for the Twenty-first Century
Type Book
Author Kathleen L. Barber
Publisher Ohio State University Press
ISBN 9780814208540
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 236
Title Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics
Type Book
Author William A. Barnett
Author Melvin Hinich
Author Norman Schofield
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521428316
Date 1993-07-30
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Part I outlines relevant concepts in political economy, including implementation, community, ideology, and institutions. Part II covers theory and applications of the spatial model of voting. Part III considers the different characteristics that govern the behaviour of institutions, while Part IV analyses competition between political representatives. Part V is concerned with the way in which government acquires information held by voters or advisors, and Part VI addresses government choice on monetary policy and taxation.
# of Pages 540
Title The control of politicians: An economic model
Type Journal Article
Author Robert J. Barro
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF01718440
Volume 14-14
Issue 1
Pages 19-42
Publication Public Choice
ISSN 0048-5829, 1573-7101
Date 3/1973
DOI 10.1007/BF01718440
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order
Type Book
Author Ulrich Beck
Publisher Wiley
ISBN 9780745617589
Date 1997-01-31
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Those who advocate ideas about “postmodernity” and “post-industrialism” offer radical critiques of existing social and political institutions. But they provide very little in place of those institutions. It is all very well to criticize the limitations of social democracy, the welfare state, trade unionism, and social classes as agents of change, but once these have been thrown into crisis what other institutions do we have to depend on?The Reinvention of Politics, suggests we should think again about forging a new model of politics for our times. An active, devolved civil society, Beck argues, can sustain the claim that modernity is inherently democratic. For many issues now – for example, those involving technology, environment protest, the family, or gender relations – belong to the domain of what the author calls “subpolitics”. The postmodern critique of modernity, in Beck’s view, is based on mistaken generalizations about a transitional phase in the evolution of modern society. What is needed, he argues, is the reinvention of politics, corresponding to th new demands of a society which remains modern, but which has progressed beyond the earlier form of industrial society.
# of Pages 220
Title The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background
Type Journal Article
Author Samuel H. Beer
Volume 51
Issue 03
Pages 613-650
Publication American Political Science Review
Date 1957
DOI 10.2307/1951852
Library Catalog Cambridge Journals Online
Title Unemployment matters: Voting patterns during the economic transition in Poland, 1990–1995
Type Journal Article
Author Janice Bell
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139708412499
Volume 49
Issue 7
Pages 1263-1291
Publication Europe-Asia Studies
ISSN 0966-8136, 1465-3427
Date 11/1997
DOI 10.1080/09668139708412499
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title The state of the economy and voting : an ambiguous relationship
Type Journal Article
Author André Bernard
Volume 38
Issue 2
Pages 245-264
Publication Revue Française de Sociologie
ISSN ISSN 0035-2969
Date 1997
Abstract Does the state of the economy influence voting ? This article attempts to find a reply to this question with the examination of numerous works on the subject, for a large part in English, going back to the first studies by Kramer, which analyse the effects of the economy on voting decisions. At the same time it provides an index of all the different types of analysis, generally differing by their method, on this subject, and speaks in particular of complex methods which integrate the economy as a variable factor among others which may effect voting.
Title Moving West or Going South?: Economic Transformation and Institutionalization in Postcommunist Party Systems
Type Journal Article
Author Michael Bernhard
Author Ekrem Karakoç
Volume 44
Issue 1
Pages 1-20
Publication Comparative Politics
Date 2011-10-01T00:00:00///
Journal Abbr Comparative Politics
DOI 10.5129/001041510X13815229366444
Library Catalog IngentaConnect
Abstract Patterns of party system institutionalization have varied widely across regions. In postcommunist democracies, weak party system institutionalization exists at high levels along three dimensions—volatility of representation, party extinction, and incumbency disadvantage—despite sustained economic growth. In these cases, the effects of economic restructuring are critical to electoral outcomes. A sample of democratic elections from 1990 to 2006 shows that postcommunist countries whose reform strategies minimize increases in inequality have more institutionalized party systems.
Title Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting
Type Journal Article
Author Christopher R. Berry
Author William G. Howell
URL http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1965296
Volume 69
Issue 03
Pages 844-858
Publication The Journal of Politics
Date 2007
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00579.x
Library Catalog Cambridge Journals Online
Title Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government
Type Book
Author Timothy Besley
Publisher OUP Oxford
ISBN 9780199283910
Date 2007-08-23
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract What is good government? Why do some governments fail ? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in Timothy Besley’s intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One which emphasizes government as a force for public good that can regulate markets, distribute resources and generally work towards improving the lives of its citizens. The other sees government as driven by private interests, susceptible to those with the power to influence its decisions and failing to incentivize its officials to act for the greater public good. This book adopts a middle way between the two extremes, the Publius approach, which recognizes the potential for government to act for the public good but also accepts the fact that things often go wrong. It shares the view that there are certain institutional preconditions for effective government but then proceed to examine exactly what those preconditions are. Timothy Besley emphasises that it is not just about designing an appropriate institutional framework but also about understanding the way incentives work and the process by which the political class is selected.
# of Pages 266
Title The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
Type Journal Article
Author T. Besley
Author R. Burgess
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1162/003355302320935061
Volume 117
Issue 4
Pages 1415-1451
Publication The Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 2002-11-01
DOI 10.1162/003355302320935061
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens are a key issue in political economy. Here, we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role for both democratic institutions and mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that state governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop flood damage via public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure where newspaper circulation is higher and electoral accountability greater.
Title Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Type Journal Article
Author Timothy Besley
Author Anne Case
URL http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/abs/10.1257/002205103321544693
Volume 41
Issue 1
Pages 7-73
Publication Journal of Economic Literature
ISSN 0022-0515
Date 03/2003
DOI 10.1257/002205103321544693
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes. It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of political economy. Second, it develops a parallel empirical analysis that updates studies in the literature and re-examines some of the claims made, in a setting unified both in terms of policy outcomes and the period under study. Third, the paper develops some new directions for research, presenting a small number of novel exploratory results.
Title Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
Type Journal Article
Author T. Besley
Author A. Case
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.2307/2946699
Volume 110
Issue 3
Pages 769-798
Publication The Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 1995-08-01
DOI 10.2307/2946699
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.
Title Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition
Type Journal Article
Author Timothy Besley
Author Anne Case
URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v85y1995i1p25-45.html
Volume 85
Issue 1
Pages 25-45
Publication American Economic Review
Date 1995
Library Catalog RePEc – IDEAS
Abstract This paper develops a model of the political economy of tax-setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters’ choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously. Voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems. This forces incumbents into a (yardstick) competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing. The authors provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using U.S. state data from 1960 to 1988. The results are encouraging to the view that vote-seeking and tax-setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
Title Parliamentary representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: legislative recruitment and careers in eleven European countries
Type Book
Editor Heinrich Best
Editor Maurizio Cotta
Series Comparative European politics
Place Oxford [England] ; New York
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 0198297939
Date 2000
Call Number JN8 .P37 2000
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
Abstract Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000 deals with long-term changes in parliamentary recruitment and patterns of political careers in eleven European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom) from the middle of the 19th century to the end of the millennium. Through individual country chapters, written by international experts native to each area, the book focuses on transformations in the social background, education, political career paths, and entrenchment in pressure groups and party offices of those who sat in national parliaments. These transformations are traced on the basis of a comprehensive and integrated data-set (the DATACUBE) providing, for the first time, the prerequisites for a truly comparative study of parliamentary representation in Europe. In addition, information about institutional settings, the development of party systems, and the political events and processes of social change that helped to shape the recruitment and career paths of members of parliament, is given for each country. Further, by placing the representative at the centre, two fundamental and to some extent contradictory processes underlying the development towards parliamentary democracy in Europe, namely democratisation and political professionalisation, are addressed. The book concludes with a synopsis which proposes a developmental model of parliamentary representation in Europe during the last 150 years.
# of Pages 549
Title The Emergence of Political Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author C. Bidner
Author P. Francois
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/qje/qjt014
Volume 128
Issue 3
Pages 1397-1448
Publication The Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 2013-04-16
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt014
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract When and how do democratic institutions deliver accountable government? In addressing this broad question, we focus on the role played by political norms-specifically, the extent to which leaders abuse office for personal gain and the extent to which citizens punish such transgressions. We show how qualitatively distinct political norms can coexist because of a dynamic complementarity, in which citizens’ willingness to punish transgressions is raised when they expect such punishments to be used in the future. We seek to understand the emergence of accountability by analysing transitions between norms. To do so, we extend the analysis to include the possibility that, at certain times, a segment of voters are (behaviorally) intolerant of transgressions. Our mechanism highlights the role of leaders, offering an account of how their actions can instigate enduring change, within a fixed set of formal institutions, by disrupting prevailing political norms. We show how such changes do not depend on “sun spots” to trigger coordination, and are asymmetric in effect-a series of good leaders can (and eventually will) improve norms, whereas bad leaders cannot damage them. JEL Codes: D72, P16, C73.
Title Elections and democratization in Ukraine
Type Book
Author Sarah Birch
Place Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : New York
Publisher Macmillan Press ; St. Martin’s Press
ISBN 0333800451
Date 2000
Call Number JN6639.A5 B57 2000
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
Abstract Elections and Democratization in Ukraine analyses the role of competitive elections in Ukraine’s crucial democratic transition period of 1989 to 1998. The series of four parliamentary elections, two presidential elections and three referendums which punctuated Ukraine’s road to democracy provide important insights into the social and political forces shaping the new state’s identity. Two specific research questions are addressed: – How do Ukranian voters make vote choices? – Which electoral cleavages are the most important? Contrary to those who claim that the Soviet Union left in its wake an atomized society with weak social divisions, this study argues that the Ukrainian electorate has, from the advent of competitive elections, exhibited relatively stable patterns of voting behaviour which can be explained to a great extent in terms of social divisions that developed in Soviet Ukraine and were made politically salient by the events of the transition period.
# of Pages 212
Title The parliamentary elections in Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author Sarah Birch
Volume 22
Issue 3
Pages 524-531
Publication Electoral Studies
Date 2003
Title The Economics of Post-Communist Transition
Type Book
Author Olivier J. Blanchard
Publisher Oxford University Press, Incorporated
ISBN 9780198289265
Date 1997
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, as Blanchard points out, has adhered to a U-shaped response in terms of economic output–that is, a sharp decline in output followed by a recovery. Today, most of the countries of Central Europe seem to have enjoyed a steady upswing, while most Eastern European nations still appear to be near the bottom of the U. This book traces the courses, causes, and implications of this pattern, arguing that two basic mechanisms dominate such transition. The first is the reallocation between the state and private sectors, with a contraction of activities in the former and an expansion in the latter. The second is the restructuring of the old state sector, with the opportunity for large improvements in productivity. Against this background, the book’s focus shifts to three particular factors: the adjustment of employment and wages in state firms to the initial shock of reduced demand for their goods; the dynamics of restructuring and privatization; and the relationship between reallocation, restructuring, and traffic in the labor market. The final section summarizes the discussion, and in doing so builds a general equilibrium model as a preliminary to the analysis of three sets of issues: the role of unemployment benefits and privatization `ules; the interaction between transition and fiscal policy; and the evolution of the support for reform. The model is then used to address the thorny issue of the ideal speed for economic reform. The latest offering from a distinguished expert on the economics of transition, this is one of the first book-length analyses of the process of moving from a centrally-planned to a market economy.
# of Pages 176
Title Coordination in Dynamic Social Networks Under Heterogeneity
Type Journal Article
Author Michał Bojanowski
Author Vincent Buskens
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0022250X.2010.509523
Volume 35
Issue 4
Pages 249-286
Publication The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
ISSN 0022-250X, 1545-5874
Date 10/2011
DOI 10.1080/0022250X.2010.509523
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract People often make choices or form opinions depending on the social relations they have, but they also choose their relations depending on their preferred behavior and their opinions. Most of the existing models of coevolution of networks and individual behavior assume that actors are homogeneous. In this article, we relax this assumption in a context in which actors try to coordinate their behavior with their partners. We investigate with a game-theoretic model whether social cohesion and coordination change when interests of actors are not perfectly aligned as compared to the homogeneous case. Using analytical and simulation methods we characterize the set of stable networks and examine the consequences of heterogeneity for social optimality and segregation in emerging networks.
Title Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model
Type Journal Article
Author Mauricio Soares Bugarin
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s003550200172
Volume 20
Issue 1
Pages 137-154
Publication Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN 0176-1714, 1432-217X
Date 2003-1-1
DOI 10.1007/s003550200172
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article presents a dynamic game theoretic model of voting in the presence of asymmetric information about a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world. Voters may use both vote splitting and reelection as mechanisms of electoral control. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, voters will reelect an Executive incumbent if a minimum level of social outcome, n*, is attained. The main findings are that voters tend to be more demanding, requiring a higher value for n*, if they expect the true state of the world to be favorable, and less demanding if they believe the state of the world is unfavorable. Moreover, vote splitting will be chosen if a favorable state is expected, whereas if an unfavorable state is more likely, voters reduce pressure over the incumbent by choosing a unified government.
Title Democracy Transformed? Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies
Type Book
Author Bruce E. Cain
Author Russell J. Dalton
Author Susan E. Scarrow
Series Comparative Politics
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780199291649
Date 2006-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 332
Title The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion
Type Journal Article
Author Brandice Canes-Wrone
Author Kenneth W. Shotts
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00096.x
Volume 48
Issue 4
Pages 690-706
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0092-5853, 1540-5907
Date 10/2004
DOI 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00096.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens’ preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection-seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.
Title Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting
Type Journal Article
Author Brandice Canes-Wrone
Author David W. Brady
Author John F. Cogan
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055402004276
Volume 96
Issue 01
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2004-3-3
DOI 10.1017/S0003055402004276
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-calld ecisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents’ electoral performance and roll-call support for their party-controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors-through a series of tests of the 1956-1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member’s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members.
Title Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas
Type Journal Article
Author John M Carey
Author Matthew Soberg Shugart
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0261379494000352
Volume 14
Issue 4
Pages 417-439
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date December 1995
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract Seat allocation formulas affect candidates’ incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.
Title Rethinking democratic representation: eight theoretical issues
Type Conference Paper
Author Dario Castiglione
Author Mark E. Warren
URL (…)Rethinking_Democratic_Representation_May_2006.pdf
Place Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. University of British Columbia
Date May 18-19, 2006
Conference Name Rethinking Democratic Representation
Language en
Title Rethinking Women’s Substantive Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Karen Celis
Author Sarah Childs
Author Johanna Kantola
Author Mona Lena Krook
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00344890802079573
Volume 44
Issue 2
Pages 99-110
Publication Representation
ISSN 0034-4893
Date 2008
DOI 10.1080/00344890802079573
Library Catalog Taylor and Francis+NEJM
Abstract This article seeks to rethink how scholars have traditionally studied women’s substantive representation. It outlines a framework that aims to replace questions like ‘Do women represent women?’ with ones like ‘Who claims to act for women?’ and ‘Where, how, and why does the substantive representation of women occur?’ Arguing that representation occurs both inside and outside legislative arenas, the article calls attention to the wide range of actors, sites, goal, and means that inform processes of substantive representation.
Title The Polish games of transition
Type Journal Article
Author Josep M. Colomer
Author Margot Pascual
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0967067X94900159
Volume 27
Issue 3
Pages 275-294
Publication Communist and Post-Communist Studies
ISSN 0967067X
Date 9/1994
DOI 10.1016/0967-067X(94)90015-9
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Using formal tools from game theory, the first phases of the process of transition to democracy in Poland in 1988-1989 are modeled as a succession of strategic interactions among political actors. Because the Polish process of change was temporarily ahead of others in Eastern Europe, certain false expectations on actors’ future power in the middle term were entertained. These miscalculations allowed the communist party and the democratic opposition represented by Solidarity to negotiate and agree on a round-table. However, the results of the first competitive election, in which the democratic opposition won by a landslide, revealed the real bargaining power of each party, breached the political arrangement previously negotiated, and precipitated the fall of the communist regime. Some refined tools of game theory, such as the assumption of an initial state of the game, the conditions of imperfect information, and the order of moves, show their relevance to an explanation of the viability of strictly non-equilibrium outcomes in real political games such as those of the Polish transition from authoritarian rule.
Title Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems
Type Book
Author Gary W. Cox
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521585279
Date 1997-03-28
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Professor Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political actors must solve. Under plurality rule, for example, not every leftist aspirant for the presidency can run at once, if the Left is to have a good chance of winning. But although all leftists will benefit from unifying behind a single candidate, they may not agree on which candidate that should be. Analogous coordination problems – and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination – arise in all electoral systems. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This is also the first book that considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
# of Pages 362
Title Elections as instruments for punishing bad representatives and selecting good ones
Type Journal Article
Author Brian F. Crisp
Author Santiago Olivella
Author Joshua D. Potter
Author William Mishler
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379413001406
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 9/2013
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.08.017
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Many theories of democracy point out that voters make their choices based on two goals: the retrospective assessment of incumbents and the prospective choice between incumbents and challengers. Do voters react to malfeasance on the part of their elected representatives? If they abandon corrupt incumbents, are they able to select more virtuous replacements? In this paper, we assess the effects of corruption on voter loyalty and, conversely, of voter defection on subsequent malfeasance. We examine these relationships with data drawn from 169 elections across 72 countries. Our results show that malfeasance does indeed provoke voter defection, but that electoral volatility is not followed by lower levels of perceived corruption. We conclude by discussing the appropriate interpretation of our results, the future research they suggest, and their meaning for related, emerging literatures.
Title On Democracy
Type Book
Author Robert Alan Dahl
Publisher Yale University Press
ISBN 9780300084559
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract The last half of the 20th century has been an era of democratic triumph. The main anti-democratic regimes – communist, fascist, Nazi – have disappeared, and new democracies are emerging vigorously or tentatively throughout the world. In this book, one of the most prominent political theorists of our time provides a primer on democracy that clarifies what it is, why it is valuable, how it works, and what challenges it confronts in the future.
# of Pages 228
Title A Preface to Democratic Theory, Expanded Edition
Type Book
Author Robert A. Dahl
Publisher University of Chicago Press
ISBN 022611872X
Date 2013-05-29
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Robert Dahl’s Preface helped launch democratic theory fifty years ago as a new area of study in political science, and it remains the standard introduction to the field. Exploring problems that had been left unsolved by traditional thought on democracy, Dahl here examines two influential models—the Madisonian, which represents prevailing American doctrine, and its recurring challenger, populist theory—arguing that they do not accurately portray how modern democracies operate. He then constructs a model more consistent with how contemporary democracies actually function, and, in doing so, develops some original views of popular sovereignty and the American constitutional system. For this fiftieth-anniversary edition, Dahl has written an extensive new afterword that reevaluates Madisonian theory in light of recent research. And in a new foreword, he reflects back on his influential volume and the ways his views have evolved since he wrote it. For any student or scholar of political science, this new material is an essential update on a gold standard in the evolving field of democratic theory. “A Preface to Democratic Theory is well worth the devoted attention of anyone who cares about democracy.”—Political Science Quarterly
# of Pages 198
Title Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies
Type Book
Author Russell J. Dalton
Publisher Oxford University Press, UK
ISBN 9780199268436
Date 2004-03-18
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 244
Title Political Learning in Post-Communist Elections
Type Journal Article
Author K. Dawisha
Author S. Deets
URL http://eep.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0888325406293290
Volume 20
Issue 4
Pages 691-728
Publication East European Politics and Societies
ISSN 0888-3254
Date 2006-11-01
DOI 10.1177/0888325406293290
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article draws several conclusions. First, that elections provide critical information for shaping behavior, since in the second and third rounds, party elites and voters behaved in ways that were rational considering the outcome of the previous election. Second, on the whole, states have adopted a variety of systems and rarely changed them in major ways after the second round of elections, indicating that electoral systems quickly become constraining institutions. Where they have been changed, movement has been away from the extremes of either high disproportionality or proportionality. Third, results from the first three rounds of elections indicate declines in party system fragmentation, disproportionality volatility, and wasted votes, indicating a growth in strategic voting. Finally, except in the very important case of party volatility, and Russia, the view that there is a generalized gap between the post-Soviet cases and the East European cases is not supported by the evidence.
Title Ideologues or Pragmatists?
Type Journal Article
Author Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
Author Amanda Friedenberg
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01032.x
Volume 9
Issue 5
Pages 931-951
Publication Journal of the European Economic Association
ISSN 15424766
Date 10/2011
DOI 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01032.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We study a model of electoral control where the politician is a policy expert, but the voter is not. First, we focus on the case of an “ideologue”, namely a politician who always wants the same policy implemented regardless of the state. We show that the voter’s lack of policy expertise comes at no cost to him, but may come at an electoral cost to the politician. Next, we turn to the case of a “pragmatist”, namely a politician whose preferences are state contingent. We show that the voter’s lack of policy expertise does come at a cost to him. As a consequence, the voter may fare better with an ideologue than with a pragmatist. This can occur even if the pragmatist’s preferences are arbitrarily close to and perfectly correlated with the voter’s. (JEL: C72, D82, D86)
Title Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies
Type Journal Article
Author Scott W. Desposato
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00170.x
Volume 50
Issue 1
Pages 62-80
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0092-5853, 1540-5907
Date 01/2006
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00170.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Party switching by legislators has been common in many countries, including the Philippines, Italy, Nepal, Ecuador, Russia, and Japan. While frequently dismissed as simply an indicator of a weak parties, switching provides a unique window on party systems. To the extent that we understand affiliation decisions, we gain insight on the way politicians use parties to advance their careers. In this article I offer a model of party-membership patterns, where decisions to switch party or to stay put are a function of the strategic interaction of legislators and endogenous party leaders. I test the model on the case of Brazil, where switching is common. Results suggest that Brazilian legislators use parties to maximize pork, ideological consistency, and short-term electoral success, but which of these matters most depends on constituents, i.e., legislators use parties for different purposes in different electoral environments. The approach developed here could easily be applied to study legislative behavior in other political systems.
Title The impact of party-switching on legislative behavior in Brazil
Type Report
Author Scott W. Desposato
URL http://faculty. virginia. edu/partyswitching/papers/cv05-desposato.pdf
Date 2005
Report Type Unpublished paper
Abstract “In this paper, I examine the impact of party-switching on legislator’s roll-call votes in Brazil. About one-third of deputies change party during each four year term; some change as many as seven times. Such volatility challenges basic concepts of representation – if legislators
change their policy positions to accommodate their new party, they
violate the basic utility of party labels for electoral information cost
reduction. This research has an additional utility. Legislative scholars
agree that political parties are important parts of modern democracy,
but roll-call based measures of party influence cannot separate out
the influence of legislators own preferences and party directives. Analyzing the behavior of switchers before and after they change party
gives us leverage on this and the ongoing “do parties matter”” debates.
I find significant and consistent party effects on legislative behavior, even when controlling for executive influence.
Title A New Dimension of Social Stratification in Poland? Class Membership and Electoral Voting in 1991-2001
Type Journal Article
Author H. Domanski
URL http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/esr/jcm041
Volume 24
Issue 2
Pages 169-182
Publication European Sociological Review
ISSN 0266-7215, 1468-2672
Date 2007-11-25
DOI 10.1093/esr/jcm041
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, the debate on class politics takes on a different form to that in the West-its concern is whether class divisions increased as the post-communist societies made the transition to the market system. Using Polish survey data on respondents voting behaviour in elections of 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2001, I present evidence on the significance of social class for voting behaviour. Results of log-linear analysis show that class membership does indeed exert a significant impact on voting behaviour. Although it changed across the time, it appeared no less in 2001 than in 1991. Also the patterns of this association (which class votes which party) remained unchanged. On the whole our evidence suggests that in Poland a new dimension of social stratification-that which is referred in sociological literature as class politics-has emerged. At the same time, claims for the class basis of voting in Poland should not be exaggerated, as the class-vote link in Poland is much lower than in most of the Western societies. To estimate the relative strength of this association I compared it across 17 countries using data from the European Social Survey 2002.
Title Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control
Type Journal Article
Author Silvia Dominguez-Martinez
Author Otto H. Swank
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-006-0105-3
Volume 26
Issue 3
Pages 527-545
Publication Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN 0176-1714, 1432-217X
Date 2006-3-28
DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0105-3
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, they also have to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties than office motivated parties to collect information. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter’s interest.
Title Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street
Type Journal Article
Author Michael Dorsch
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6
Volume 155
Issue 3-4
Pages 211-228
Publication Public Choice
ISSN 0048-5829, 1573-7101
Date 2011-10-19
DOI 10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the United States. The paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics. District heterogeneity implies district-specific electoral constraints on legislators’ ability to collect rents from, and cast dissonant votes in support of, special interests. An empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal, using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables. The empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias, using valid instruments, and considers several intuitive sub-sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue. The paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout.
Title An economic theory of democracy
Type Book
Author Anthony Downs
Publisher Harper
Date 1957
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract This book seeks to elucidate its subject-the governing of democratic state-by making intelligible the party politics of democracies. Downs treats this differently than do other students of politics. His explanations are systematically related to, and deducible from, precisely stated assumptions about the motivations that attend the decisions of voters and parties and the environment in which they act. He is consciously concerned with the economy in explanation, that is, with attempting to account for phenomena in terms of a very limited number of facts and postulates. He is concerned also with the central features of party politics in any democratic state, not with that in the United States or any other single country.
# of Pages 330
Title Guest Editor’s Introduction: Defining Political Inequality Within a Cross-National Perspective
Type Journal Article
Author Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow
URL <a href=”http://mesharpe.metapress.com/(&#8230;)
Volume 37
Issue 4
Pages 3-9
Publication International Journal of Sociology
ISSN 0020-7659
Date 2007-12-1
DOI 10.2753/IJS0020-7659370400
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title A Developmental Model of Heterogeneous Economic Voting in New Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author R. M. Duch
Volume 95
Issue 4
Pages 895-910
Publication American Political Science Review
Date 2001
Abstract I argue that information and trust in nascent democratic institutions are two important sources of heterogeneity in economic voting in transition democracies. Economic voting develops in postcommunist electorates as ambiguity regarding the link between government policy and economic outcomes declines. The link becomes less ambiguous as citizens become more informed about how democratic institutions function and gain increasing confidence or trust in the responsiveness of these institutions to public preferences. In the early period of democratization the conditions necessary for an effective agency relationship between voter and incumbent are not yet fully developed. Economic voting increases as these levels of information on, and trust in, government rise. The analysis that tests these propositions is based on a public opinion survey conducted in Hungary in 1997. The test is replicated with a 1997 Polish election survey.
Title The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results
Type Book
Author R. M. Duch
Author R.T. Stevenson
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781139470629
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 359
Title Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information
Type Journal Article
Author John Duggan
URL http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111%2F1468-0343.00071
Volume 12
Issue 2
Pages 109-135
Publication Economics and Politics
ISSN 0954-1985, 1468-0343
Date 07/2000
DOI 10.1111/1468-0343.00071
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one-dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re-election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.
Title Electoral Behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Carmen Gonzales Enriquez
Volume 27
Issue 3
Publication Revue d’etudes comparatives est-ouest
Date 1996
Abstract The author describes and analyses some common features of electoral behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe, starting from the results of 15 free parliamentary elections held in this area since 1989. The analysis looks at the evolution of the post-communist vote, the growing electoral abstention, the volatility of the vote, and the fragmentation of parliamentary representation resulting from the break-up of the parties and the dissipation of the vote. The loyalty of the big national minorities to their respective parties is emphasised (in fact, they are the only loyal voters), and the article examines the difficulties of public opinion polls in forecasting electoral behaviour in the countries concerned. The article ends with a comparison between the political effects of the first free parliamentary elections in Central and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, and in Latin American and South European countries, on the other. The author points out that the concept of ”founding elections”, elaborated from the experience of this second set of countries, does not apply in Eastern Europe, because in this area the first democratic elections did not lead the party system to ”gell”. Hungary is the only exception, being the only country where the same parties were found in the first and the second parliaments.
Title The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness
Type Journal Article
Author Heinz Eulau
Author Paul D. Karps
URL http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/439340?uid=3738840&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103491158051
Volume 2
Issue 3
Pages 233
Publication Legislative Studies Quarterly
ISSN 03629805
Date 08/1977
DOI 10.2307/439340
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction
Type Book
Author David M. Farrell
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 9780333801611
Date 2001-02-10
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Electoral Systems examines the six principal types of electoral systems currently in use in more than 50 of the world’s democracies: single member plurality, alternative vote, two-round systems, list, single transferable vote, and the currently fashionable “mixed” systems. A common format is adopted throughout, dealing with explanations of how the system operates and its effects on the political system. The book concludes with three chapters assessing the (systemic and strategic) consequences of electoral systems, the factors behind selecting certain electoral systems over others, and the question of whether there is a “trade-off” between the proportionality and stability.
# of Pages 260
Title Economic and political effects on European Parliamentary electoral turnout in post-communist Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Christine Fauvelle-Aymar
Author Mary Stegmaier
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379408000826
Volume 27
Issue 4
Pages 661-672
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 12/2008
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2008.05.008
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The relatively low voter turnout rates in the June 2004 European Parliamentary elections in many of the post-communist states surprised observers. While the average turnout rate for these new-EU member states barely surpassed 30%, turnout exhibited much variance at the national and sub-national levels. In this article, we study the economic and political determinants of European Parliamentary voter turnout in the post-communist countries using a unique region-level clataset. Our regression results reveal that regional unemployment rates have a statistically significant impact on turnout. Regions with higher unemployment rates experienced lower turnout, even after controlling for political and socio-demographic factors. In contrast to some previous work on the impact of EU support on EP turnout, our study uncovers a positive relationship between these two variables. Further, we show that the timing of the election relative to the next national election and the frequency of elections affected turnout. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title Self-Enforcing Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author J. D. Fearon
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/qje/qjr038
Volume 126
Issue 4
Pages 1661-1708
Publication The Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 2011-12-07
DOI 10.1093/qje/qjr038
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract If democracy is to have the good effects said to justify it, it must be self-enforcing in that incumbents choose to hold regular, competitive elections and comply with the results. I consider models of electoral accountability that allow rulers a choice of whether to hold elections and citizens whether to rebel. When individuals observe diverse signals of government performance, coordination to pose a credible threat of protest if the ruler “shirks” is problematic. The convention of an electoral calendar and known rules can provide a public signal for coordinating rebellion if elections are suspended or blatantly rigged, while the elections themselves aggregate private observations of performance. Two threats to this solution to political moral hazard are considered. First, a ruling faction that controls the army may prefer to fight after losing an election, and ex post transfers may not be credible. A party system in which today’s losers may win in the future can restore self-enforcing democracy, though at the cost of weaker electoral control. Second, subtle electoral fraud can undermine the threat of coordinated opposition that maintains elections. I show that when there are organizations in society that can observe and announce a signal of the extent of popular discontent, the incumbent may prefer to commit to fair elections over an “accountable autocratic” equilibrium in which public goods are provided but costly rebellions periodically occur.
Title Incumbent performance and electoral control
Type Journal Article
Author John Ferejohn
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00124924
Volume 50
Issue 1-3
Pages 5-25
Publication Public Choice
ISSN 0048-5829, 1573-7101
Date 1986
DOI 10.1007/BF00124924
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Information and democratic processes
Type Book
Author John A. Ferejohn
Author James H. Kuklinski
Publisher University of Illinois Press
ISBN 9780252016790
Date 1990
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 442
Title Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes <sup>*</sup>
Type Journal Article
Author Claudio Ferraz
Author Frederico Finan
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/doi/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703
Volume 123
Issue 2
Pages 703-745
Publication Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 05/2008
DOI 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This paper uses publicly released audit reports to study the effects of disclosing information about corruption practices on electoral accountability. In 2003, as part of an anticorruption program, Brazil’s federal government began to select municipalities at random to audit their expenditures of federally transferred funds. The findings of these audits were then made publicly available and disseminated to media sources. Using a data set on corruption constructed from the audit reports, we compare the electoral outcomes of municipalities audited before versus after the 2004 elections, with the same levels of reported corruption. We show that the release of the audit outcomes had a significant impact on incumbents’ electoral performance, and that these effects were more pronounced in municipalities where local radio was present to divulge the information. Our findings highlight the value of having a more informed electorate and the role played by local media in enhancing political selection.
Title Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Type Journal Article
Author Claudio Ferraz
Author Frederico Finan
URL http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/abs/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
Volume 101
Issue 4
Pages 1274-1311
Publication American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282
Date 06/2011
DOI 10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract “We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use
audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We
find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can
get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27
percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives.
These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less
access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that
enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining
politician’s corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)”
Title Economics of voting in post-communist countries
Type Journal Article
Author Jan Fidrmuc
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379499000487
Volume 19
Issue 2–3
Pages 199-217
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date June 2000
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00048-7
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract I analyze economic determinants of voting behavior in post-communist elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. I argue that election results reflect the voters’ experience with economic reforms: those who benefited from the reforms vote for the right wing pro-reform parties, whereas those who have become worse off vote for the left wing parties. This identifies two categories of voters, the winners and the losers of reforms. The winners are the private entrepreneurs, white-collar workers, and university educated voters. On the other hand, the losers are the unemployed, retirees, and blue collar and agricultural workers. Cross-section patterns of political support are determined by the parties’ association with the reforms rather than their incumbency status. Incumbency only appears significant in explaining the marginal vote gain or loss between elections.
Title Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition countries
Type Journal Article
Author Jan Fidrmuc
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0014292199000069
Volume 44
Issue 8
Pages 1491-1513
Publication European Economic Review
ISSN 00142921
Date 8/2000
DOI 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00006-9
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract I analyze the relationship between economics and politics across eight parliamentary elections in four transition countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. I argue that support for reform reflects the balance between positive and negative effects of the reform. Accordingly, I identify economic groups that support or oppose the reform. The former are private entrepreneurs, white collar workers acid university educated voters. The latter are the unemployed, retirees, and blue collar and agricultural workers. This general pattern holds both within countries and across countries, and across tenures of different governments. In contrast with the responsibility hypothesis, voters in the transition countries are found to be forward looking, not retrospective. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D72; E24; E61.
Title Retrospective Voting in American National Elections
Type Book
Author Morris P. Fiorina
Publisher Yale University Press
ISBN 9780300025576
Date 1981-01-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 249
Title Coalition government and electoral accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Stephen D. Fisher
Author Sara B. Hobolt
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379410000156
Volume 29
Issue 3
Pages 358-369
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 9/2010
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.03.003
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Single-party governments are commonly thought to be more clearly responsible for government policy than coalition governments. One particular problem for voters evaluating coalition governments is how to assess whether all parties within a coalition should be held equally responsible for past performance. As a result, it is generally argued that voters are less likely to hold coalition governments to account for past performance. This article uses data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to assess whether and how the composition of coalition governments affects the way in which people use their votes to hold governments to account, and which parties within coalitions are more likely to be held to account for the government’s past performance. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title Delegation and Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Justin Fox
Author Stuart V. Jordan
Volume 73
Issue 03
Pages 831-844
Publication The Journal of Politics
Date 2011
DOI 10.1017/S0022381611000491
Library Catalog Cambridge Journals Online
Abstract Critics of legislative delegation to the bureaucracy worry that delegation undermines the accountability of politicians to voters. This article provides microfoundations for such concerns by examining a model of electoral agency in which legislators can either determine policy directly or delegate policymaking authority to an expert bureaucrat. In our model, when deciding whether to delegate, a politician must consider not only the policy consequences of his delegation decision but also the electoral consequences. We identify conditions under which delegation can provide politicians with an element of plausible deniability which they lack when they determine policy directly. In some circumstances, therefore, voters can be better off when legislators’ ability to delegate is restricted.
Title Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Justin Fox
Author Kenneth W. Shotts
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381609990260
Volume 71
Issue 04
Pages 1225
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2009-10-22
DOI 10.1017/S0022381609990260
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Politicians vary in both their competence and their policy preferences. We show that how voters trade off competence against ideological congruence has key implications for the type of representation incumbents provide. When voters privilege competence, they encourage trustee representation, and when voters emphasize ideological congruence, they encourage delegate representation. Selection on competence is most likely to occur when uncertainty about the policy preferences of politicians is minimal. A surprising implication of our analysis is that ideological congruence between incumbents and voters is not a necessary precondition for trustee representation to be rewarded at the ballot box.
Title Partisanship and the effectiveness of oversight
Type Journal Article
Author Justin Fox
Author Richard Van Weelden
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0047272710000484
Volume 94
Issue 9-10
Pages 674-687
Publication Journal of Public Economics
ISSN 00472727
Date 10/2010
DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.003
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive’s proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive’s reputation. Our main result is that partisanship can improve the efficacy of an oversight regime, as the distortions caused by a partisan overseer’s desire to affect the executive’s reputation can offset the distortions caused by her desire to enhance her own. Our results provide a new rationale for divided government, as partisan considerations are often necessary to prevent the overseer from rubber stamping all executive proposals.
Title Identity, Exclusion, and Critique: A Response to Four Critics
Type Journal Article
Author N. Fraser
URL http://ept.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1474885107077319
Volume 6
Issue 3
Pages 305-338
Publication European Journal of Political Theory
ISSN 1474-8851
Date 2007-07-01
DOI 10.1177/1474885107077319
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In this article I reply to four critics. Responding to Linda Alcoff, I contend that my original two-dimensional framework discloses the entwinement of economic and cultural strands of subordination, while also illuminating the dangers of identity politics. Responding to James Bohman, I maintain that, with the addition of the third dimension of representation, my approach illuminates the structural exclusion of the global poor, the relation between justice and democracy, and the status of comprehensive theorizing. Responding to Nikolas Kompridis, I defend a view of recognition that prioritizes the critique of institutionalized injustice. Responding to Rainer Forst, I argue that such a critique is better formulated in participation-theoretic than justification-theoretic terms.
Title Survey Article: Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices and Their Consequences
Type Journal Article
Author Archon Fung
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-9760.00181
Volume 11
Issue 3
Pages 338-367
Publication Journal of Political Philosophy
ISSN 0963-8016, 1467-9760
Date 09/2003
DOI 10.1111/1467-9760.00181
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Electoral accountability in the developing world
Type Journal Article
Author François Gélineau
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379413000784
Volume 32
Issue 3
Pages 418-424
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 9/2013
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.030
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Do citizens of the developing world behave as economic voters? Do they blame and reward incumbent governments for their perceived economic performance? In addressing these questions, the current paper fills an important void left by the extant literature by adopting a large-n approach with the use of public opinion survey data and by focusing on emerging democracies of the developing world. The proposed analysis develops a series of incumbent support models to assess the impact of economic assessments. It relies on the use of public opinion survey data from countries of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and East Asia, and the Arab world. The paper contributes to the extant literature at the empirical, methodological, and theoretical levels. Empirically, it provides a unique and systematic account of the phenomenon through a large-scale comparative approach. Theoretically, it contributes to the debate on the value of economic voting to explain electoral behavior in the developing world. Methodologically, it shows that using presidential approval is a fair alternative to vote choice and that a full model specification is not absolutely necessary to estimating the economic effect.
Title Citizens’ Policy Confidence and Electoral Punishment: A Neglected Dimension of Electoral Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Alan S. Gerber
Author Gregory A. Huber
Author David Doherty
Author Conor M. Dowling
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381611000892
Volume 73
Issue 04
Pages 1206-1224
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2011-10-4
DOI 10.1017/S0022381611000892
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract If voters punish elected officials who adopt incongruent policy positions, then representatives should take popular positions to avoid electoral sanction. Yet, scholars have noted gaps between citizen preferences and the behavior of elected officials. We argue that one important source of this gap is that individual citizens believe they are sometimes not well qualified to evaluate policy. Our analysis of a series of experiments shows that citizens’ stated confidence in their own ability to evaluate a policy proposal substantially affects their willingness to reward or punish a representative for their votes on that policy. Our results hold both across individuals (within policy areas) and within individuals (across policy areas) and suggest that, rather than a failure of representation, gaps between citizen preferences and policy may reflect citizen deference to “expert” legislators. We also show that understanding differences in policy confidence has important implications for understanding the contours of public opinion.
Title Does government performance matter? Electoral support for incumbents in six post-communist countries
Type Journal Article
Author Sergiu Gherghina
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13569775.2011.597144
Volume 17
Issue 3
Pages 257-277
Publication Contemporary Politics
ISSN 1356-9775
Date 2011
DOI 10.1080/13569775.2011.597144
Library Catalog Taylor and Francis+NEJM
Abstract For two decades, the Central and Eastern European party politics has been characterized by the widespread inability of parties to secure stable political support (reflected in high levels of electoral volatility) to allow their presence in government for consecutive terms. This paper investigates the factors that trigger support for incumbent parties in post-communist countries. In doing so, it examines the effect of individual evaluations at the systemic level (i.e. satisfaction with democracy, government activity), partisan attachment (i.e. preference), and objective indicators of individual economic success (i.e. the level of income) on the vote for incumbents. This cross-national analysis is conducted at the individual-level in six post-communist countries chosen on the basis of the most similar system design. The study uses data from election surveys at two different moments in time (mid-1990s and the first elections of the 2000s) and combines bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses. The results indicate that partisanship and positive evaluations of the government explain most of the vote for incumbents. Apart from these visible patterns, there are some other valuable results in specific countries understandable solely within the larger domestic political context.
Title Economic influences on the political support for market reform in post‐communist transitions: Some evidence from the 1993 polish parliamentary elections
Type Journal Article
Author John Gibson
Author Anna Cielecka
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139508412287
Volume 47
Issue 5
Pages 765-785
Publication Europe-Asia Studies
ISSN 0966-8136, 1465-3427
Date 07/1995
DOI 10.1080/09668139508412287
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Political Economy
Type Journal Article
Author C. A. E. Goodhart
Author R. J. Bhansali
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1970.tb00659.x
Volume 18
Issue 1
Pages 43-106
Publication Political Studies
ISSN 0032-3217, 1467-9248
Date 03/1970
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1970.tb00659.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Challenger Entry and Voter Learning
Type Journal Article
Author Sanford C. Gordon
Author Gregory A. Huber
Author Dimitri Landa
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055407070165
Volume 101
Issue 02
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2007-5-21
DOI 10.1017/S0003055407070165
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We develop a model of strategic interaction between voters and potential electoral challengers to sitting incumbents, in which the very fact of a costly challenge conveys relevant information to voters. Given incumbent failure in office, challenger entry is more likely, but the threat of entry by inferior challengers creates an incentive for citizens to become more politically informed. At the same time, challenges to incumbents who perform well can neutralize a voter’s positive assessment of incumbent qualifications. How a voter becomes politically informed can in turn deter challengers of different levels of competence from running, depending on the electoral environment. The model permits us to sharpen our understanding of retrospective voting, the incumbency advantage, and the relationship between electoral competition and voter welfare, while pointing to new interpretations of, and future avenues for, empirical research on elections.
Title Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government
Type Journal Article
Author David Granlund
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-010-9682-x
Volume 148
Issue 3-4
Pages 531-546
Publication Public Choice
ISSN 0048-5829, 1573-7101
Date 2010-7-21
DOI 10.1007/s11127-010-9682-x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.
Title Symposium: How Can One Person Represent Another?
Type Journal Article
Author A. Phillips Griffiths
Author Richard Wollheim
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106658
Volume 34
Pages 187-224
Publication Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes
Date 1960
Title Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective
Type Book
Author Bernard Grofman
Publisher University of Michigan Press
ISBN 0472083430
Date 1995
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy is one of the handful of books that reshaped political science in the post-World War II period. Information, Participation, and Choice traces the influence of Downs’s ideas on subsequent research on voters, candidates, and parties in the United States and elsewhere. Since their publication in 1957, Downs’s seminal ideas — tweedledum and tweedledee politics and the “rationality” of political ignorance and nonparticipation on the part of voters–have shaped an ongoing debate about how politics actually work. The debate pits a public-choice model inspired by microeconomic precepts against a traditional textbook model that presumes a responsible, informed, and civic-minded citizenry and a set of elected officials motivated by concern for the public interest and policy convictions. The essays comprising Information, Participation, and Choice, by leading political scientists and economists, provide both a summary of Downs’s key theoretical insights and an empirical examination of how well models inspired by Downs accurately describe U.S. political competition for Congress and the presidency. Bernard Grofman is Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine.
# of Pages 298
Title The Electoral Consequences of Party Switching by Incumbent Members of Congress, 1947-2000
Type Journal Article
Author Christian R. Grose
Author Antoine Yoshinaka
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.3162/036298003X200809
Volume 28
Issue 1
Pages 55-75
Publication Legislative Studies Quarterly
ISSN 03629805
Date 02/2003
DOI 10.3162/036298003X200809
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switcher’s party and in the the opposing party (the switcher’s “old” party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher’s new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch.
Title Why there is (almost) no Christian Democracy in post-communist Europe
Type Journal Article
Author A. Grzymala-Busse
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068811407596
Volume 19
Issue 2
Pages 319-342
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688, 1460-3683
Date 2011-06-10
DOI 10.1177/1354068811407596
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Compared to its West European counterparts, post-communist Christian Democracy is notable for its lack of success. Even in the most religious of post-communist democracies, no Christian Democratic (CD) party has claimed a plurality of the electorate. At the same time, there is a considerable range in average electoral support from 1990 to 2010, i.e. from 0.7 percent in Estonia to as high as 18.4 percent in Slovakia. The most successful CD parties have arisen in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania, and (with qualifications) in Macedonia. The reasons for this success lie not in popular religiosity, state-church conflict or alliances between CD parties and churches. Instead, where parties can point to a history of nation and state-building in the inter-war period, they receive an initial electoral boost from this historical legacy. Yet even these favourable historical reputations have transitory effects: by the second or third elections, the impact of inter-war support rapidly faded.
Title Democracy and Disagreement
Type Book
Author Amy Gutmann
Author Dennis Thompson
Publisher Harvard University Press
ISBN 9780674038066
Date 2009-06-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract The din and deadlock of public life in America–where insults are traded, slogans proclaimed, and self-serving deals made and unmade–reveal the deep disagreement that pervades our democracy. The disagreement is not only political but also moral, as citizens and their representatives increasingly take extreme and intransigent positions. A better kind of public discussion is needed, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson provide an eloquent argument for “deliberative democracy” today. They develop a principled framework for opponents to come together on moral and political issues. Gutmann and Thompson show how a deliberative democracy can address some of our most difficult controversies–from abortion and affirmative action to health care and welfare–and can allow diverse groups separated by class, race, religion, and gender to reason together. Their work goes beyond that of most political theorists and social scientists by exploring both the principles for reasonable argument and their application to actual cases. Not only do the authors suggest how deliberative democracy can work, they also show why improving our collective capacity for moral argument is better than referring all disagreements to procedural politics or judicial institutions. “Democracy and Disagreement” presents a compelling approach to how we might resolve some of our most trying moral disagreements and live with those that will inevitably persist, on terms that all of us can respect.
# of Pages 444
Title Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
Type Book
Author Jürgen Habermas
Publisher MIT Press
ISBN 9780262581622
Date 1998-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract In Between Facts and Norms Jürgen Habermas works out the legal and political implications of his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), bringing to fruition the project announced with his publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. This new work is a major contribution to recent debates on the rule of law and the possibilities ofdemocracy in postindustrial societies, but it is much more. The introduction by William Rehg succinctly captures the special nature of the work, noting that it offers a sweeping, sociologically informed conceptualization of law and basic rights, a normative account of the rule of law and the constitutional state, an attempt to bridge normative and empirical approaches to democracy, and anaccount of the social context required for democracy. Finally, the work frames and caps these arguments with a bold proposal for a new paradigm of law that goes beyond the dichotomies that have afflicted modern political theory from its inception and that still underlie current controversies between so- called liberals and civic republicans.The book includes a postscript written in 1994, which restates the argument in light of its initial reception, and two appendixes, which cover key developments that preceded the book..
# of Pages 686
Title The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry Into a Category of Bourgeois Society
Type Book
Author Jürgen Habermas
Publisher MIT Press
ISBN 9780262581080
Date 1991
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 332
Title Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author M. A. G. Harper
URL http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0010414000033009004
Volume 33
Issue 9
Pages 1191-1227
Publication Comparative Political Studies
ISSN 0010-4140
Date 2000-11-01
DOI 10.1177/0010414000033009004
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This study tests the hypothesis that the replacement of incumbent promarket, prodemocracy governments with ex-communist parties in postcommunist East European elections was a function of the economic calculus of frustrated citizens at the ballot box. Using data from the Central andEastern Euro-Barometer studies, this investigation adopts an individual-level approach to examine the degree to which economic assessments and unemployment influenced both proreform incumbent and ex-communist patty voting intentions in Lithuania (1992), Hungary (1994), and Bulgaria(1994). The dominant impression that emerges from the logistic regression estimations predicting voting intentions is that despite strong expectations to the contrary, economic factors had at best a modest effect on party choice in these nations. These findings corroborate country-specific studies of electoral behavior in Eastern Europe that observe that the return to parliamentary power of ex-communist parties in these societies was not simply a function of economic voting.
Title The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises
Type Journal Article
Author Jr., Joseph E. Harrington
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825683710043
Volume 5
Issue 1
Pages 71-97
Publication Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN 08998256
Date 1/1993
DOI 10.1006/game.1993.1004
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract It is part of the political science folklore that candidates are inclined to keep their campaign promises out of fear of not being reelected. This paper develops a multiperiod signaling model for the purpose of exploring the validity of this folklore. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a candidate to reveal his true policy intentions during the campaign. A crucial condition for campaign speeches to be informative is that voters′ policy preferences respond to the incumbent′s performance. The refining of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the multiperiod signaling context is also explored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, C73.
Title Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections
Type Journal Article
Author Joseph E. Harrington
URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v83y1993i1p27-42.html
Volume 83
Issue 1
Pages 27-42
Publication American Economic Review
Date 1993
Library Catalog RePEc – IDEAS
Abstract This paper explores the role of reelection pressures in determining economic policy. By assuming that voters are uncertai n as to the efficacy of different policies, a reelection process is derived that depends on both a politician’s past policies and the level of economic activity during his time in office. It is shown th at the less uncertain are voters as to which policy is best, the more likely is a politician to manipulate policy for reelection purposes. Manipulation entails implementing the policy that is more likely to be well received rather than the one that maximizes income. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
Title Models of Democracy
Type Book
Author David Held
Publisher Stanford University Press
ISBN 9780804754729
Date 2006
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 360
Title Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching
Type Book
Author William Heller
Author Carol Mershon
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 9780230622555
Date 2009-06-23
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Political parties and democratic politics go hand in hand. Since parties matter, it matters too when elected politicians change party affiliation. This book shows when, when, and to what effect politicians switch parties in pursuit of their goals, as constrained by institutions and in response to their environments. The contributors examine diverse settings, from Europe to Israel, from the United States to Japan, from Russia to Brazil. They also integrate formal and empirical approaches in political science. The book demonstrates that taking party switching seriously enriches the understanding of political parties, legislative politics, policy making, and democratic representation.
# of Pages 331
Title Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes
Type Journal Article
Author Timothy Hellwig
Author David Samuels
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123408000045
Volume 38
Issue 01
Publication British Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0007-1234, 1469-2112
Date 2007-12-7
DOI 10.1017/S0007123408000045
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Do voters reward or punish incumbents for retrospective performance similarly in different democratic regimes? Despite debates on the merits of different regimes, little research has investigated the implications of constitutional design on voters’ ability to hold politicians to account. This article shows that regime type determines the way and extent to which elections enable voters to reward or sanction incumbents. These regime effects are separate from and conceptually prior to factors previously identified in the literature on comparative economic voting. Analysis of elections from seventy-five countries reveals that, all else equal, voters have greater potential to hold incumbents to accounts under the separation of powers than under parliamentarism. Moreover, variables particular to separation of powers systems-the electoral cycle in pure presidential systems and instances of cohabitation in semi-presidential systems – affect the relative impact of the attribution of responsibility. The results contribute to ongoing debates about the relative advantages of different constitutional formats for democratic performance.
Title Causes and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author Erik S. Herron
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668130220139190
Volume 54
Issue 4
Pages 625-639
Publication Europe-Asia Studies
ISSN 0966-8136, 1465-3427
Date 06/2002
DOI 10.1080/09668130220139190
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Public Trust in the New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author John R. Hibbing
Author Samuel C. Patterson
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb00299.x
Volume 42
Issue 4
Pages 570-592
Publication Political Studies
ISSN 0032-3217, 1467-9248
Date 12/1994
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb00299.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract After the collapse of the Soviet empire, democratic parliamentary elections were conducted in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and new parliaments convened, in the early 1990s. How much confidence did citizens in these new democracies have in their new parliament? Under what conditions is citizens’ trust in parliament meagre or ample? Public opinion surveys conduced in 1990-1 in nine countries – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Ukraine – provide data for analysing citizens’, trusting or distrusting orientations. Parliamentary trust is significantly influenced by perceptions of economic conditions, and by confidence in politicians and government generally but, surprisingly, not much affected by political awareness or involvement levels, political efficacy, or social class differentials. These findings indicate that public confidence in these parliaments will grow with economic prosperity and the demonstrated effectiveness of the government to govern.
Title Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare
Type Journal Article
Author Jean Hindriks
Author Ben Lockwood
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S017626800900007X
Volume 25
Issue 3
Pages 385-397
Publication European Journal of Political Economy
ISSN 01762680
Date 9/2009
DOI 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.01.004
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline. as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a “minimum winning coalition” of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Title DNA polymerase in nuceoli isolated from Ehrlich ascites tumor cells
Type Journal Article
Author H Hirano
Author K Higashi
Author Y Sakamoto
Volume 67
Issue 2
Pages 518-524
Publication Biochemical and biophysical research communications
ISSN 0006-291X
Date Nov 17, 1975
Extra PMID: 1017
Journal Abbr Biochem. Biophys. Res. Commun.
Library Catalog NCBI PubMed
Language eng
Title Challenger Emergence, Incumbent Success, and Electoral Accountability in State Legislative Elections
Type Journal Article
Author Robert E. Hogan
Volume 66
Issue 4
Pages 1283 – 1303
Publication Journal of Politics
ISSN 1468-2508
Date 2004
DOI 10.1111/j.0022-3816.2004.00300.x
Abstract This analysis examines the influence of state, district, and candidate-level factors on the reelection prospects of state legislative incumbents. Campaigns in 14 states over two election cycles (1996 and 1998) are used to determine how various conditions result in the likelihood that incumbents are challenged, the strength of the challenge they face, and the percentage of the vote they receive in contested elections. A major concern is determining the influence of policy responsiveness of incumbents relative to institutional characteristics (e.g., legislative professionalism) and district-level conditions (e.g., past winning-vote percentage). What role does each set of factors play and at what point in the election process are their effects realized? Findings show that institutional and district factors are strong determinants of both the likelihood of a challenge as well as the strength of a challenge. Policy responsiveness of incumbents has a small influence, mostly on voter support. Overall, the findings provide insight into the factors responsible for incumbent success and electoral competition in state legislative elections.
Title Democracy and Transparency
Type Journal Article
Author James R. Hollyer
Author B. Peter Rosendorff
Author James Raymond Vreeland
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381611000880
Volume 73
Issue 04
Pages 1191-1205
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2011-10-21
DOI 10.1017/S0022381611000880
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Are democracies more transparent than other types of political regimes? Many people believe that the presence of elections alone is not sufficient for a country to be considered democratic and that transparency must be included as part of the definition of political regime. We agree that contestability of elections and transparency of policymaking are analytically distinct concepts. Adopting minimalist approaches to democracy and transparency, we ask a basic question: do electoral politics provide incentives for governments to disseminate data? We thus investigate theoretically the relationship between regime type and the willingness of policy makers to provide credible announcements on policy-relevant variables. And we demonstrate empirically that the availability (or absence) of policy-relevant data is correlated with regime type, even after controlling for GDP per capita, IMF participation, country fixed-effects, and time trends’. Democracies are indeed more transparent.
Title Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
Type Journal Article
Author B. Holmstrom
Author P. Milgrom
URL http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Volume 7
Issue special
Pages 24-52
Publication Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
ISSN 8756-6222, 1465-7341
Date 1991-01-01
DOI 10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?
Type Journal Article
Author Gregory A. Huber
Author Sanford C. Gordon
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519881?origin=crossref
Volume 48
Issue 2
Pages 247
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 00925853
Date 04/2004
DOI 10.2307/1519881
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Through their power to sentence, trial judges exercise enormous authority in the criminal justice system. In 39 American states, these judges stand periodically for reelection. Do elections degrade their impartiality? We develop a dynamic theory of sentencing and electoral control. Judges discount the future value of retaining office relative to implementing preferred sentences. Voters are largely uninformed about judicial behavior, so even the outcome of a single publicized case can be decisive in their evaluations. Further, voters are more likely to perceive instances of underpunishment than overpunishment. Our theory predicts that elected judges will consequently become more punitive as standing for reelection approaches. Using sentencing data from 22,095 Pennsylvania criminal cases in the 1990s, we find strong evidence for this effect. Additional tests confirm the validity of our theory over alternatives. For the cases we examine, we attribute at least 1,818 to 2,705 years of incarceration to the electoral dynamic.
Title Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author John D. Huber
Author G. Bingham Powell
Volume 46
Issue 03
Pages 291-326
Publication World Politics
Date 1994
DOI 10.2307/2950684
Library Catalog Cambridge Journals Online
Abstract This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. In the Majority Control vision, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In the Proportionate Influence vision, election outcomes result in legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative bargaining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to those visions and link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They then attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congruence between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of governments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis reveals weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.
Title Political economy: institutions, competition, and representation: proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics
Type Book
Author International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics
Editor William A. Barnett
Editor Melvin J. Hinich
Editor Norman Schofield
Series International symposia in economic theory and econometrics
Place Cambridge ; New York
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 0521417813
Date 1993
Call Number JA77 .I58 1991
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
Abstract The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Section 1 investigates models of voting and representation, section 2 explores dimensions of political institutions, section 3 covers strategic aspects of competition, and section 4 examines key aspects of government behavior.
# of Pages 522
Title Transitional Electoral Systems in Post-Communist Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author John T. Ishiyama
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2658164?origin=crossref
Volume 112
Issue 1
Pages 95
Publication Political Science Quarterly
ISSN 00323195
Date 21/1997
DOI 10.2307/2658164
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Party strategies and electoral competition in post-Communist countries: Evidence from Poland
Type Journal Article
Author John E. Jackson
Author Bogdan W. Mach
Author Radosław Markowski
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379410000065
Volume 29
Issue 2
Pages 199-209
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 6/2010
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.01.005
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Poland’s major post-Communist party, the SLD, was an electorally successful legacy party during the 1990’s. An analysis of Polish National Election Studies data and data from a separate study of new firm creation in Poland indicates their success was built on two important and related factors. One is the growth of new firms, which stimulated the growth of a centrist constituency who voted for parties supporting economic reforms. Second, the SLD adapted to this constituency by themselves becoming more economically liberal, as documented by Grzymata-Busse (2002). A conditional logit model of voter choice in the 1997 and 2001 elections relates votes to the distance between voters’ preferences on economic policies and the positions of the competing parties. From this analysis we estimate that if the SLD had remained an ideological non-reformist party as did the KSCM in the Czech Republic and the CPRF in Russia it would have been a far weaker party as measured by vote and seat shares. Without the new firm creation, an ideological SLD cum KSCM could have been electorally successful as was the CPRF. The paper concludes by contrasting the the Polish, Czech and Russian post-Communist parties and extending the implications of the results to other developing and industrial economies faced with the need for structural change. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title Do Parties Benefit from Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93
Type Journal Article
Author M. M. Kaminski
URL http://jtp.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/095169280201400303
Volume 14
Issue 3
Pages 325-358
Publication Journal of Theoretical Politics
ISSN 0951-6298
Date 2002-07-01
DOI 10.1177/095169280201400303
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Electoral reforms had profound political consequences for post-communist Poland. The majoritarian system helped to accelerate the fall of communism, while later changes to the electoral law helped the former communists reclaim power. Despite the high stakes and top priority given to electoral design by political players, their efforts at manipulation were hardly rewarded. Although the political parties were ex ante seat-maximizers, they supported the electoral law that ex post would have given them the most seats about as frequently as they supported its closest competitor. The reasons for their miscalculations included a lack of methodological expertise, unexpected shifts in voter preferences, transition-specific poll biases and new entrants and coalitions that emerged in the period between the introduction of the new electoral law and elections. No significant differences among the various kinds of parties were found. The results do show that the effectiveness of manipulation increased strongly over time.
Title Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Adrian Karatnycky
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20048358?origin=crossref
Volume 77
Issue 1
Pages 13
Publication Foreign Affairs
ISSN 00157120
Date 1998
DOI 10.2307/20048358
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The Polish elections may signal the dawning of a political force in Central and Eastern Europe-Christian democracy, with emphasis on both words.
Title Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison
Type Journal Article
Author Mark Andreas Kayser
Author Michael Peress
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055412000275
Volume 106
Issue 03
Pages 661-684
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2012-8-24
DOI 10.1017/S0003055412000275
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract When the economy in a single country contracts, voters often punish the government. When many economies contract, voters turn against their governments much less frequently. This suggests that the international context matters for the domestic vote, yet most research on electoral accountabilityassumes that voters treat their national economies as autarkic. We decompose two key economic aggregates-growth in real gross domestic product and unemployment-into their international and domestic components and demonstrate that voters hold incumbents more electorally accountable for the domestic than for the international component of growth. Voters in a wide variety of democracies benchmark national economic growth against that abroad, punishing (rewarding) incumbents for national outcomes that underperform (outperform) an international comparison. Tests suggest that this effect arises not from highly informed voters making direct comparisons but from “pre-benchmarking” by the media when reporting on the economy. The effect of benchmarked growth exceeds that of aggregate national growth by up to a factor of two and outstrips the international component of growth by an even larger margin, implying that previous research may have underestimated the strength of the economy on the vote.
Title The responsible electorate: Rationality in presidential voting.1936-1960. Foreword by Arthur Maass
Type Book
Author Valdimer O. Key
Author Milton C. Cummings
Publisher Belknap Press
Date 1968
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 158
Title Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation
Type Book
Author Herbert Kitschelt
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521658904
Date 1999-08-13
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Post-Communist Party Systems examines democratic party competition in four post-communist polities in the mid- 1990’s, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Polan d. Legacies of pre-communist rule turn out to play as much a role in accounting for differences as the institutional differences incorporated in the new democratic rules of the game. The book demonstrates various developments within the four countries with regard to different voter appeal of parties, patterns of voter representation, and dispositions to join other parties in legislative or executive alliances. The authors also present interesting avenues of comparison for broader sets of countries.
# of Pages 476
Title Patterns of Party Competition and Electoral Accountability in Latin America
Type Conference Paper
Author Herbert Kitschelt
Author Elizabeth Zechmeister
Place Philadelphia
Date 2003
Conference Name Annual meeting of the American Policial Science Association
Title The importance of party ideology: Explaining parliamentarian support for political party gender quotas in Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author J. Kjerulf Dubrow
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068810377190
Volume 17
Issue 5
Pages 561-579
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688, 1460-3683
Date 2010-10-11
DOI 10.1177/1354068810377190
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Party gender quotas are rules voluntarily adopted within political party structures that aim at securing a set percentage of women to appear on candidate lists in elections for political office. Although parliamentarian support is critical to the adoption and enforcement of party gender quotas, empirical studies of parliamentarian opinion on this matter are few, and none are concerned with countries of Eastern Europe. In the context of Poland, this study addresses two main questions: (a) why do some parliamentarians support party gender quotas? And (b) what are the most important reasons? Using survey data on Polish parliamentarians, I examine the role of three major determinants of variation in party gender quota support: parliamentarian’s gender; economic and religious political party ideologies; and placement on the candidate list. Cross-tabulations reveal that women parliamentarians and parliamentarians from parties with economic statist and anti-clerical ideologies are more likely to support quotas than are those from economic liberal and Catholic traditionalist parties. In addition, parliamentarians placed low on the party’s electoral list in the previous election are more likely to support quotas than those placed at the top. Logistic regression analyses including all these determinants show that the only statistically significant effects pertain to economic and religious party ideologies. Discussion of the theoretical implications of party ideology being the most important explanatory factor for parliamentarian support of party gender quotas concludes this article.
Title Parties, policies, and democracy
Type Book
Author Hans-Dieter Klingemann
Author Richard I. Hofferbert
Author Ian Budge
Publisher Westview Press
ISBN 9780813320687
Date 1994-08-30
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 352
Title Social Structure and Personality under Conditions of Radical Social Change: A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author Melvin L. Kohn
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
Author Krystyna Janicka
Author Valeri Khmelko
Author Bogdan W. Mach
Author Vladimir Paniotto
Author Wojciech Zaborowski
Author Roberto Gutierrez
Author Cory Heyman
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657430?origin=crossref
Volume 62
Issue 4
Pages 614
Publication American Sociological Review
ISSN 00031224
Date 08/1997
DOI 10.2307/2657430
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Does the relationship between social structure and personality during times of apparent social stability obtain as well under conditions of radical social change? There are good reasons to think that it might not. To find out, we conducted surveys in Poland and Ukraine during 1992-1993, with dramatic results. In those respects in which the socialist Poland of 1978 had shown a pattern of relationships similar to that of the capitalist United States and Japan (notably, the relationship of social structure to self-directedness of orientation), the pattern remains the same; but where socialist Poland in 1978 had differed from the United States and Japan (notably, in the relationship of social structure to a sense of distress), Poland now fully exemplifies the capitalist pattern. Ukraine seems to be following a similar trajectory, albeit at a slower pace.
Title Structural Location and Personality during the Transformation of Poland and Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author Melvin L. Kohn
Author Wojciech Zaborowski
Author Krystyna Janicka
Author Valeriy Khmelko
Author Bogdan W. Mach
Author Vladimir Paniotto
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
Author Cory Heyman
Author Bruce Podobnik
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3090108?origin=crossref
Volume 65
Issue 4
Pages 364
Publication Social Psychology Quarterly
ISSN 01902725
Date 12/2002
DOI 10.2307/3090108
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In this paper we extend the analysis of social structure and personality, heretofore generally limited to the class positions and social-stratification levels of the employed, to encompass the nonemployed as well. We do this in a comparative study of Poland and Ukraine during an early period of their transformations from socialism to nascent capitalism. The analysis involves the systematic comparison of the nonemployed segments of the adult populations of these countries-those who were unemployed and looking for work, housewives, pensioners, and students-with the employed and with each other The relationships between “structural location” and personality are statistically significant and nontrivial in magnitude, both for men and for women in both countries. Some of these relationships appear to reflect the extent of job loss and the resulting social compositions of the nonemployed segments of the population. The relationships result also, in substantial part, from the conditions of life experienced by the nonemployed segments of the population. Some of the nonemployed (most of all, the involuntary housewives) were subjected to economic duress, resulting in a sense of distress. Moreover, the conditions of life of unemployed and pensioned Poles (we do not have comparable data for Ukraine) were not as conducive to, or requiring of, complex activity as are those of gainfully employed men and women. This finding helps explain their relatively low levels of intellectual flexibility and self-directedness of orientation.
Title Do mixed electoral systems matter? A cross-national analysis of their effects in Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Tatiana Kostadinova
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379400000329
Volume 21
Issue 1
Pages 23-34
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 3/2002
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(00)00032-9
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The effects of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules on politics have been broadly examined in the literature but cross-national studies have failed to appropriately include mixed systems in institutional analyses. This paper develops a theoretical argument about the consequences of the new type of electoral rules as compared to the two older “pure” systems. Multivariate regression analysis of data from sixteen East European countries is used to test the main hypotheses about the relative effect of mixed systems and the importance of their specific design. The results suggest that the East European mixed systems have contributed to the election of fewer bigger winners which could stimulate the evolution of moderately fragmented party systems. The findings show that there are effective mechanisms available to electoral engineers to shape parliamentary majorities under mixed rules.
Title Does Democratization Depress Participation? Voter Turnout in the Latin American and Eastern European Transitional Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author Tatiana Kostadinova
Author Timothy J. Power
URL http://prq.sagepub.com/content/60/3/363
Volume 60
Issue 3
Pages 363-377
Publication Political Research Quarterly
ISSN 1065-9129, 1938-274X
Date 09/01/2007
Journal Abbr Political Research Quarterly
DOI 10.1177/1065912907304154
Library Catalog prq.sagepub.com
Language en
Abstract Scholars and policy makers have advanced conflicting hypotheses about the dynamics of voter participation in nascent democratic regimes. The authors advance the research program by examining 108 parliamentary elections in postauthoritarian Latin America and post-Communist Europe from 1978 through 2003. Institutional, political, and demographic variables shape turnout in new democracies, but there is also a strong temporal effect: voter turnout drops sharply after founding elections and continues to fall through the fourth electoral cycle. Moreover, after appropriate controls, rates of turnout in Eastern Europe are consistently higher than the equivalent rates for Latin America. The authors attribute these differences to historical legacies and the mode of transition to democracy.
Title Patterns of political instability: Affiliation patterns of politicians and voters in post-communist Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
Type Journal Article
Author Marcus Kreuzer
Author Vello Pettai
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02686269
Volume 38
Issue 2
Pages 76-98
Publication Studies in Comparative International Development
ISSN 0039-3606, 1936-6167
Date 6/2003
DOI 10.1007/BF02686269
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In contrast to established party systems, the transformation of post-communist party systems is not only shaped by shifts in electoral preferences, but also by the changing organizational loyalties of politicians. Post-communist politicians pursue a wide range of organizational strategies such as party fusions, fissions, start-ups, and interparty switching. By focusing on the interaction between these organizational strategies and voters’ electoral preferences, we argue that the seeming instability of post-communist party systems actually reveals distinct patterns of political change. The article develops an analytical framework, which incorporates politician-driven interparty mobility and voter-induced electoral change. It uses this framework to show that the apparently inchoate party systems of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania actually follow definable modes of transformation.
Title The Calculus of Party Affiliation in Post-Communist Democracies: Party Switching, Fusions, Fissions and the Institutionalization of the Party Systems
Type Conference Paper
Author Marcus Kreuzer
Author Vello Pettai
Volume 29
Place Boston, MA
Date 2002
Proceedings Title APSA Annual Meeting
Title Unexpected Winners: The Significance of an Open-List System on Women’s Representation in Poland
Type Journal Article
Author Sheri Kunovich
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1743923X12000141
Volume 8
Issue 02
Pages 153-177
Publication Politics & Gender
ISSN 1743-923X, 1743-9248
Date 2012-6-13
DOI 10.1017/S1743923X12000141
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Scholars have debated the impact of open-list systems on women’s representation. While some argue that open lists provide a unique opportunity for voters to overcome parties’ bias against women, others argue that they create additional barriers. I examine several mechanisms that impact women’s representation within Poland’s open-list system. Results suggest that 1) voters shift women’s original list placements positively across all parties over three elections; 2) these shifts are more pronounced when women’s overall presence on the list and list placement are lower, regardless of party; and 3) positive shifts often result in the election of substantially more women than would have been expected. These findings add to our understanding of open-list systems by documenting variability in the effects of preferential voting across time and party in a postcommunist context. In addition, the unexpected positive effects of preferential voting in Poland add to a growing body of evidence that voters and parties on the center and right support female candidates at rates approaching or similar to parties on the left.
Title The Representation of Polish and Czech Women in National Politics: Predicting Electoral List Position
Type Journal Article
Author Sheri Kunovich
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150177
Volume 35
Issue 3
Pages 273-291
Publication Comparative Politics
ISSN 00104159
Date Apr., 2003
Extra ArticleType: primary_article / Full publication date: Apr., 2003 / Copyright © 2003 The City University of New York
Library Catalog JSTOR
Abstract In both Poland and the Czech Republic women are significantly less likely than men to obtain the first or top positions on electoral lists, even when political experience as candidates and elected officials is controlled, but particular types of parties are more likely to place women in top positions on electoral lists. The likelihood of women to secure a top position on electoral lists is examined through logistic regression. Political experience, characteristics of political parties, and district magnitude are controlled. Differences in the effects of political experience, party, and district characteristics on the likelihood of securing a top position on electoral lists are compared.
Title Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women’s National Political Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Sheri Kunovich
Author Pamela Paxton
URL http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_sociology_research/5
Publication American Journal of Sociology
Date 2005-09-01
Title Multicultural Citizenship : A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
Type Book
Author Will Kymlicka
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780191520976
Date 1995-06-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 300
Title A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Type Book
Author Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher MIT Press
ISBN 9780262121743
Date 1993
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation willguide economists’ research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and largeliterature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, whileoffering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on theirpathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffontand Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on theregulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportationauthorities.The book’s clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizesregulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the newregulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questionstackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductorychapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency.The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics.Eachchapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicablemodel, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, includingsufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory.Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a descriptionof complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the bookvaluable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at theend of the book.
# of Pages 744
Title Decentralization and electoral accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Ignacio Lago-Peñas
Author Santiago Lago-Peñas
URL http://www.envplan.com/abstract.cgi?id=c0981
Volume 28
Issue 2
Pages 318-334
Publication Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
ISSN 0263-774X, 1472-3425
Date 2010
DOI 10.1068/c0981
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract On the basis of aggregated and individual-level survey data of national and regional elections in Spain, this paper analyzes how economic voting is impacted by vertical and horizontal dimensions of clarity of responsibility. Our findings suggest that economic voting is enhanced when mechanisms of accountability are simple.
Title Party Structure and Organization in East-Central Europe
Type Book
Author Paul G. Lewis
Publisher Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN 9781782541363
Date 1996-01-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 264
Title Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe
Type Book
Author Paul Lewis
Publisher Routledge
ISBN 9781134634378
Date 2002-01-04
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe is the first textbook to survey the course of party developments in eastern Europe as a whole in the post-Communist period. This book relates the specifics of the post-communist situation to the broader picture of the early stages of party development in western Europe and also to contemporary models of party organisation in established democracies.The book includes:· a brief historical introduction to the context of post-communist change· the process of competitive party formation and democratic elections· the development of independent parties; their ideologies, and electoral volatility· the structure and level of organisation developed by new parties· an analysis of stable party systems which have emerged in eastern Europe and the contribution they make to emerging democracies in the regionParty Politics in Post-Communist Eastern Europe will be a comprehensive and invaluable resource, accessible to undergraduates of politics and European studies, as well as the non-specialist reader.
# of Pages 385
Title Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies
Type Book
Author Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Publisher University of Michigan Press
ISBN 0472081330
Date 1990
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract A cross-national study of the effect of economic conditions on voting behavior in the United States and the Western democracies
# of Pages 204
Title Economic voting: an introduction
Type Journal Article
Author Michael S Lewis-Beck
Author Martin Paldam
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379499000426
Volume 19
Issue 2-3
Pages 113-121
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 6/2000
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(99)00042-6
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Economic determinants of electoral outcomes
Type Journal Article
Author Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Author Mary Stegmaier
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.183
Volume 3
Issue 1
Pages 183-219
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 06/2000
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.183
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries
Type Book
Author Arend Lijphart
Publisher Yale University Press
ISBN 9780300172027
Date 2012-09-11
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract In this updated and expanded edition of his classic text, Arend Lijphart offers a broader and deeper analysis of worldwide democratic institutions than ever before. Examining thirty-six democracies during the period from 1945 to 2010, Lijphart arrives at important—and unexpected—conclusions about what type of democracy works best.Praise for the previous edition:”Magnificent. . . . The best-researched book on democracy in the world today.”—Malcolm Mackerras, American Review of Politics”I can’t think of another scholar as well qualified as Lijphart to write a book of this kind. He has an amazing grasp of the relevant literature, and he’s compiled an unmatched collection of data.”—Robert A. Dahl, Yale University”This sound comparative research . . . will continue to be a standard in graduate and undergraduate courses in comparative politics.”—Choice
# of Pages 370
Title Political power and the governmental process
Type Book
Author Karl Loewenstein
Publisher University of Chicago Press
Date 1965
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 496
Title An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Type Journal Article
Author Susanne Lohmann
URL http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2586305?uid=3738840&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103491256051
Volume 92
Issue 4
Pages 809
Publication The American Political Science Review
ISSN 00030554
Date 12/1998
DOI 10.2307/2586305
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Political Theory in the Welfare State
Type Book
Author Niklas Luhmann
Publisher Walter de Gruyter
ISBN 9780899255545
Date 1990-01-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 256
Title The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy
Type Book
Author Crawford B. Macpherson
Publisher University Press
Date 1989
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 120
Title The Principles of Representative Government
Type Book
Author Bernard Manin
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521458917
Date 1997-02-28
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract The thesis of this original and provocative book is that representative government should be understood as a combination of democratic and undemocratic elements. Challenging the conventionally held views on the subject, Professor Manin reminds us that while today representative institutions and democracy appear as virtually indistinguishable, when representative government was first established in Europe and America, it was designed in opposition to democracy proper. The author identifies the essential features of democratic institutions and reviews the history of their application.
# of Pages 260
Title Clarifying the Concept of Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Jane Mansbridge
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055411000189
Volume 105
Issue 03
Pages 621-630
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2011-8-25
DOI 10.1017/S0003055411000189
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This response to Andrew Rehfeld’s “Representation Rethought” (American Political Science Review 2009) takes up his criticisms of my “Rethinking Representation” (American Political Science Review 2003) to advance a more relational and systematic approach to representation. To this end, it suggests replacing the “trustee” concept of representation with a “selection model” based on the selection and replacement of “gyroscopic” representatives who are both relatively self-reliant in judgment and relatively nonresponsive to sanctions. It explores as well the interaction between representatives’ (and constituents’) perceptions of reality and their normative views of what the representative ought to represent. Building from the concept of surrogate representation and other features of legislative representation, it argues for investigating, both normatively and empirically, not only the characteristics of individual representatives emphasized by Rehfeld’s analysis but also the representative constituent relationship and the larger representative system, including both elected and nonelected representatives, inside and outside the legislature.
Title Rethinking Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Jane Mansbridge
Volume 97
Issue 04
Pages 515-528
Publication American Political Science Review
Date 2003
DOI 10.1017/S0003055403000856
Library Catalog Cambridge Journals Online
Abstract A long with the traditional “promissory” form of representation, empirical political scientists have recently analyzed several new forms, called here “anticipatory,” “gyroscopic,” and “surrogate” representation. None of these more recently recognized forms meets the criteria for democratic accountability developed for promissory representation, yet each generates a set of normative criteria by which it can be judged. These criteria are systemic, in contrast to the dyadic criteria appropriate for promissory representation. They are deliberative rather than aggregative. They are plural rather than singular.
Title Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements
Type Journal Article
Author Edward D. Mansfield
Author Helen V. Milner
Author B. Peter Rosendorff
URL http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S002081830244177X
Volume 56
Issue 3
Pages 477-513
Publication International Organization
ISSN 15315088, 00208183
Date 2002-8-30
DOI 10.1162/002081802760199863
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. A key source of this decline in protectionism has been the proliferation of agreements among countries to liberalize commerce. In this article, we analyze the domestic political conditions under which states have concluded such agreements and, more generally, explore the factors affecting interstate economic cooperation. We argue that interstate cooperation on commercial issues depends heavily on the political regime types of participants: as states become more democratic, they are increasingly likely to conclude trade agreements. To test our claim, we examine whether the regime types of states have influenced their propensity to form and expand preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) during the period since World War II. We find that democratic countries are about twice as likely to form a PTA as autocratic countries, and that pairs of democracies are roughly four times as likely to do so as autocratic pairs. These results provide strong evidence that democracies are more commercially cooperative than less democratic countries.
Title Why is corruption in Poland “a serious cause for concern”?
Type Journal Article
Author Clare McManus-Czubińska
Author William L. Miller
Author Radosław Markowski
Author Jacek Wasilewski
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1023/B:CRIS.0000016222.40146.4e
Volume 41
Issue 2
Pages 107-132
Publication Crime, Law and Social Change
ISSN 0925-4994
Date 03/2004
DOI 10.1023/B:CRIS.0000016222.40146.4e
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Public perceptions of corruption are significant for their political consequences. But they are conceptually and empirically distinct from corruption. First, because perceptions of corruption run far ahead of experience. Second, because different factors influence the one more than the other – indeed poverty and low education increase perceptions of corruption while decreasing participation in it. Third, because the political consequences of corruption and corruption-perceptions differ not only in degree but in their targets – perceptions and experiences of corruption erode trust in different politicians and institutions. External moralising from institutions such as the EU may reduce corruption in Accession States while simultaneously increasing perceptions of it. And within these states, that moralising ‘culture which can resist corruption’ which the EU demands, itself tends, perversely, to increase ( not decrease) perceptions, suspicions, and allegations of corruption.
Title Three roads to institutionalisation: Vote-, office- and policy-seeking explanations of party switching in Poland: three roads to institutionalisation
Type Journal Article
Author Iain McMenamin
Author Anna Gwiazda
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01985.x
Volume 50
Issue 6
Pages 838-866
Publication European Journal of Political Research
ISSN 03044130
Date 10/2011
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01985.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Party institutionalisation is a central problem in political science. The literature tends to understand it as a syndrome and therefore has difficulty explaining variations. This article suggests a new approach based on the transaction between a legislative party and its deputies, the failure of which is observable in party switching. Three routes to institutionalisation are identified by appealing to the vote-seeking, office-seeking or policy-seeking motivations of deputies. Poland has had a large volume of party switching, along with wide variation in the incentives facing differently-motivated deputies. Survival analyses of switching in four Polish parliaments find that vote-seeking is the most likely route to institutionalisation for Polish parties. Moreover, in this article a concrete hypothesis is established for comparative testing: legislative parties can survive as long as their popular support exceeds 40 per cent of their share in the previous election.
Title Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints
Type Journal Article
Author Adam Meirowitz
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00297.x
Volume 9
Issue 1
Pages 41-68
Publication Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN 1097-3923, 1467-9779
Date 02/2007
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00297.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We consider accountability in repeated elections with two long-lived parties that have distinct policy preferences and different levels of valence. In each period the government faces a privately observed feasibility constraint and selects a publicly observed policy vector. While pure strategy equilibria do not exhibit tight control on government policy making, complete control is possible in mixed strategies. In optimal equilibria voters use reelection functions which depend on policy in a manner that causes the governing party to internalize voter preferences. In these optimal equilibria the voters use different reelection functions for different parties.
Title Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Type Journal Article
Author Curtis Menton
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0
Volume 53
Issue 4
Pages 507-531
Publication Theory of Computing Systems
ISSN 1432-4350, 1433-0490
Date 2012-12-21
DOI 10.1007/s00224-012-9441-0
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the participation or structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that performing that case of control is computationally hard. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest known number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
Title Time-inconsistency, Democracy and Optimal Contingent Rules
Type Report
Author Patrick Minford
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/767.html
Date 1993
Institution C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Report Type CEPR Discussion Paper
Library Catalog RePEc – IDEAS
Abstract Following Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal paper on time-inconsistency, a large literature has explored possible frameworks within which monetary policy could overcome this problem — neatly illustrated in Barro and Gordon’s (1983) model. In a stochastic world there appears to be a trade-off between the necessary `tying of hands’ to conquer the effects of time-inconsistency and the desirability of flexible response. It is in principle possible to achieve an optimal outcome by use of a discriminatory punishment, however, with a large punishment (sufficient to deter) for using policy to exploit the Phillips curve to reduce unemployment below the natural rate, but no punishment for contingent response to shocks using the same Phillips curve. This paper sets out a model of democratic elections in which floating voters may find it optimal to follow this strategy. The significance of this possibility is that regimes which permit contingent macroeconomic policy responses, while enabling prior targets to be set and policed, are superior to those which do not. This has relevance to the debate over the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the European Monetary Union.
Report Number 767
Title Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective
Type Journal Article
Author Gerardo L. Munck
Author Carol Skalnik Leff
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/422125?origin=crossref
Volume 29
Issue 3
Pages 343
Publication Comparative Politics
ISSN 00104159
Date 04/1997
DOI 10.2307/422125
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract While the literature on democratization has devoted considerable attention to the concept of modes of transition, which captures the alternative ways in which transitions occur, attempts to explain the consequences of the mode of transition for democratic consolidation have been inconclusive. We argue that the mode of transition, defined in terms of the identity of actors in the transition and their strategies, affects the pattern of elite competition, new institutional rules, and disposition of key actors to accept or reject the new rules of the game. The mode of transition thus helps explain whether and how democracies emerge and consolidate. The argument is substantiated through a cross-regional comparison of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
Title A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context across time and nations
Type Journal Article
Author Richard Nadeau
Author Richard G Niemi
Author Antoine Yoshinaka
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379401000026
Volume 21
Issue 3
Pages 403-423
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date September 2002
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(01)00002-6
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract Powell and Whitten (Am. J. Polit. Sci. 37 (1993) 391) showed that clarity of responsibility for public policy is a key determinant of the extent of economic voting, where their measure of clarity relies heavily on long-term institutional factors. Work since then suggests that clarity of responsibility is variable across time as well as space. We create a new index that combines long-term factors with medium- and short-term factors, permitting us to examine the strength of economic voting not only across a range of countries but over time within single countries. We test the new measure using individual-level data from eight European countries over a 16-year time span. The test also uses a refined measure of retrospective economic performance based on the aggregation of individual observations. We find a strong relationship between our expanded index of clarity of responsibility and the level of economic voting. As anticipated, levels of clarity vary substantially over time within countries as well as between individual countries and groups of countries. The fact that clarity tends to peak in majoritarian systems underlines an apparent contradiction between clarity and consensualism and raises interesting questions for democratic theories in general and voting behavior in particular.
Title The VP-function: A survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years
Type Journal Article
Author Peter Nannestad
Author Martin Paldam
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF01047771
Volume 79
Issue 3-4
Pages 213-245
Publication Public Choice
ISSN 0048-5829, 1573-7101
Date 6/1994
DOI 10.1007/BF01047771
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract VP-functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables. Most studies analyze macro time series. We also cover studies of individual voters, socio-economic groups and regional cross-sections. The theory starts from the Responsibility Hypothesis: voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions. It works in two party/block systems, but not else. Voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic. Egotropic voting also occurs. Voters’ myopia is well established. Voting is retrospective as expectations are static. It costs the average government almost 2% of the vote to rule.
Title How to Control Representatives?: Remarks on Elections for the House of Representatives in Brazil.
Type Journal Article
Author Jairo Nicolau
URL http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582002000200002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt
Volume 45
Issue 2
Publication Dados
ISSN 0011-5258
Date 2002
DOI 10.1590/S0011-52582002000200002
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The purpose of this article is to explore the mechanisms that have been used by Brazilian voters to punish and reward their representatives. The article has three sections. The first discusses theoretical aspects of electoral control issues in traditional democracies. The second specifically analyzes two dimensions of the Brazilian system of representation: a) whether accountability operates on a partisan or personalized basis and b) the impact of the institutional arrangement on voters’ capacity to evaluate their representatives (clarity of responsibility). The last section explores some specific electoral control mechanisms exercised by Brazilian voters in the 1998 elections for House of Representatives.
Title Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Csaba Nikolenyi
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068804040497
Volume 10
Issue 2
Pages 123-150
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 13540688, 00000000
Date 2004-03-01
DOI 10.1177/1354068804040497
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The comparative record of cabinet stability shows interesting variation across the three most consolidated post-communist democracies: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Whereas each cabinet has been remarkably stable in post-communist Hungary, no cabinet has survived in its original composition in Poland. The cabinets that have been formed in the Czech Republic show a mixture of stability and instability: the conservative coalition government formed after the 1996 Czech elections collapsed after a little more than a year in office paving the way for early elections. In contrast, the single-party government formed by the Social Democratic Party (CSSD) after the 1998 polls has proved to be stable. In this article it is argued that cabinet stability both within and across the states can be consistently explained by the theory of dominant and central players.
Title Bureaucracy and Representative Government
Type Book
Author William A. Niskanen
Publisher Transaction Publishers
ISBN 9780202364452
Date 1974
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 254
Title Economics and politics: the calculus of support
Type Book
Editor Helmut Norpoth
Editor Michael S. Lewis-Beck
Editor Jean-Dominique Lafay
Place Ann Arbor
Publisher University of Michigan Press
ISBN 0472101862
Date 1991
Call Number JN94.A956 E27 1991
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
# of Pages 293

Notes:

Revised versions of papers given at a meeting in 1987 at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, Italy

Title Extreme Right-Wing Parties and their Variations: Comparative analysis of extreme right-wing parties’ programmes in Western and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Vedran Obućina
URL http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=65415
Volume 47
Issue 2 (184)
Pages 187-204
Publication Sociologija i prostor
ISSN 1846-5226
Date 2009/10/21
Library Catalog hrcak.srce.hr
Language hr
Abstract The main objective of this research is to evaluate variations in the extreme Right in contemporary Europe in order to better define the terminology in use and facilitate the research of radical right parties’ phenomenon. Comparative…
Title Why are there democracies? A principal agent answer
Type Journal Article
Author Brendan O’Flaherty
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00027.x
Volume 2
Issue 2
Pages 133-155
Publication Economics and Politics
ISSN 0954-1985, 1468-0343
Date 07/1990
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00027.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Many organizations operate by majority rule. Why? I consider elections as ways to aggregate information rather than ways to reconcile preferences. This is a principal-agent problem with many principals. Only mechanisms that minimize the weighted sum of type 1 errors (neglecting a deserving agent) and type 2 errors (rewarding an undeserving agent) can escape manipulation. Majority rule uniquely minimizes the sum of errors. Thus majority rule is a very good way to aggregate information.
Title Compartmentalized Competition: The Managed Transitional Election System of Poland
Type Journal Article
Author David M. Olson
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381600074223
Volume 55
Issue 02
Pages 415
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2009-12-18
DOI 10.2307/2132273
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The compartmentalized election system, negotiated for the 1989 Polish parliamentary elections, was a transitional, rather than a founding election within an authoritarian system transformation. Seats were allocated to seven compartments open to different contestants and employing different rules. Both the ensuing campaign and the electorate’s response overwhelmed the intended limited competition, with the result that the election was transformed into a regime-choice election. As a further unintended consequence of the transitional election system, Poland became the first country in which a ruling Communist party was removed from power. The Polish election of 1989 illustrates an election system as a dynamic component occurring early within, rather than at the completion of, a longer process of communist system transformation.
Title Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary
Type Journal Article
Author Patrick H. O’Neil
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100014830
Volume 48
Issue 04
Pages 579-603
Publication World Politics
ISSN 0043-8871, 1086-3338
Date 2011-6-13
DOI 10.1353/wp.1996.0017
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The Hungarian transition from socialism stands out from other examples of political change in the region, in that the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) suffered an erosion of political power generated largely from within the party itself The study shows how the Communist Party, after its destruction in the revolution of 1956, sought to institutionalize its rule through a course of limited liberalization and the broad co-optation of the populace. This policy helped create a tacit social compact with society, particularly in co-opting younger intellectuals who identified with the goals of reform socialism. However, the party eventually marginalized this group, creating an internal party opposition that supported socialism but opposed the MSZMP. Consequently, when the limits of Hungarian reform socialism became evident in the mid-1980s, rank-and-file intellectuals within the party began to mobilize against the party hierarchy, seeking to transform the MSZMP into a democratic socialist party. These ”reform circles,” drawing their strength primarily from the countryside, spread to all parts of the party and helped undermine central party power and expand the political space for opposition groups to organize. Eventually, the reform circles were able to force an early party congress in which the MSZMP was transformed into a Western-style socialist party prior to open elections in 1990. The case is significant in that it indicates that the forms of transition in Eastern Europe were not simply the specific outcome of elite interaction. Rather, they were shaped in large part by the patterns of socialist institutionalization found in each country. Therefore, studies of political transition can be enriched with an explicit focus on the institutional characteristics of each case, linking the forms of transitions and their posttransition legacies to the institutional matrix from which they emerged. In short, the study argues that the way in which an autocratic order perpetuates itself affects the manner in which that system declines and the shape of the new system that takes its place.
Title Models of strategic choice in politics
Type Book
Editor Peter C. Ordeshook
Place Ann Arbor
Publisher University of Michigan Press
ISBN 0472101226
Date 1989
Call Number JA74 .M63 1989
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
Abstract This volume’s sample of contemporary political theory draws on the rational choice paradigm in general and game theory in particular, and reveals several facts. First, applications of game theory extend beyond the adaptations of those games made familiar by introductory texts—Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and simple majority-rule voting games. Second, although the usual domain of research employing the mathematical tools has been elections and legislatures, international relations is now an especially fertile area of inquiry. Finally, because the contributions treat elections, legislative processes, and international relations, we see contemporary theory as an integrated subject. Specific models may employ different assumptions about the structure of strategic interaction, but the logic of game theory is a thread that unites them all.
# of Pages 379
Title Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Alexander C. Pacek
URL http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2111604?uid=3738840&uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103490615901
Volume 38
Issue 3
Pages 723
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 00925853
Date 08/1994
DOI 10.2307/2111604
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract While the economic voting literature is extensive, scholars have paid relatively little attention to the question of how or whether the economy affects voting behavior in non-Western democracies. I address this issue by examining national elections in three recent East Central European democracies: Bulgaria, the former Czech and Slovak Federated Republic, and Poland. Using aggregate interregional data, the macroeconomic impact on turnout and voter choice is assessed in elections held from 1990 to 1992. I argue that the effect of economic adversity on turnout is withdrawal and that the effect on party choice is punishment for incumbents held responsible for economic reform and reward for both mainstream and extremist challengers. Implications for the study of elections and the future of electoral politics in East Central Europe are discussed.
Title Who should be chef? The dynamics of valence evaluations across income groups during economic crises
Type Journal Article
Author Harvey D. Palmer
Author Guy D. Whitten
Author Laron K. Williams
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379413000620
Volume 32
Issue 3
Pages 425-431
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date September 2013
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.05.014
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract In this paper, we investigate partisan rationalization in valence politics by trying to better specify the direct and indirect effects of the economy on government support. To do so, we examine how income levels moderate the influence of objective economic conditions on perceptions of which party is the best manager of the economy during a period of economic crisis, 2004–2010, in the United Kingdom. We find that low-income voters are more responsive in their assessments of the incumbent Labour government based on unemployment, as are high-income voters in terms of inflation. In addition, high-income voters tend to behave in a manner consistent with partisan rationalization, while low-income voters do not. These conclusions offer important implications for the effectiveness of electoral control of government policy, as well as the quality of representation.
Title Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author Rohini Pande
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080154
Volume 3
Issue 1
Pages 215-237
Publication Annual Review of Economics
ISSN 1941-1383, 1941-1391
Date 09/2011
DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080154
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article evaluates a body of recent work that uses field and natural experiments to answer the question of whether informed voters can enforce better governance. A common finding in the literature is that voter behavior is malleable and that information about the political process and politician performance improves electoral accountability. Limited availability of information thus provides one explanation for the persistence of low-quality politicians and the existence of identity politics and electoral malpractices in low-income democracies. Understanding how voters can gain access to credible sources of information and understanding how politicians react to improved information about their performance are promising avenues for future research.
Title Participation and Democratic Theory
Type Book
Author Carole Pateman
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521290043
Date 1970
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 134
Title Worlds Apart? Political Theorists, Parliamentarians and the Meaning of Unequal Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Lukasz Pawlowski
Author Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow
Volume 175
Issue 3
Pages 301 – 314
Publication Polish Sociological Review
Date 2011
Abstract Although political equality is guaranteed in the Constitutions of modern democracies, few members of disadvantaged groups are parliamentarians. Political theorists, free to imagine varieties of democratic processes, increasingly pay critical attention to this problem and to the idea of representation of social groups by members of these groups, i.e. descriptive representation (DR). Yet, surprisingly few political theorists have asked the parliamentarians themselves how they conceptualize and debate the merits of DR. We use the constructivist approach to explore the meaning of unequal representation by comparing the claims of political theorists to data from a recent survey of Polish parliamentarians. We find that parliamentarians and theorists overlap in many of the basic arguments for and against descriptive representation, but with two major differences. First, parliamentarians embed their arguments in the practicalities of their job to such an extent that it is impossible to meaningfully separate theoretical ideas from their relentlessly practical approach. Second, many parliamentarians have an unyielding faith in existing democratic processes, and believe that the democratic system will, eventually, lead to equal representation. That theorists and parliamentarians inhabit different social worlds is one of the main reasons why so many theoretical ideas on how to improve contemporary democracy are rarely implemented: many of them are simply at odds with the people who are supposed to do it.
Title Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Type Report
Author Sam Peltzman
URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w0133
Date April 1976
Institution National Bureau of Economic Research
Report Type Working Paper
Library Catalog National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract In previous literature, George Stigler asserts a law of diminishing returns to group size in politics: Beyond some point it becomes counterproductive to dilute the per capita transfer. Since the total transfer is endogenous, there is a corollary that dirninishing returns apply to the transfer as well, due both to the opposition provoked by the transfer and to the demand this opposition exerts on resources to quiet it. Stigler does not himself formalize this model, and my first task will be to do just this. My simplified formal version of his model produces a result to which Stigler gave only passing recognition, namely that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains. This is at one level, a detail, which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important implications – for entry into regulation, and for the price-output structure that emerges from regulation. The main task of the paper is to derive these implications from a generalization of Stigler’s model.
Report Number 133
Title Successful re-election strategies in Brazil: the electoral impact of distinct institutional incentives
Type Journal Article
Author C. Pereira
Author L. Renno
Volume 22
Issue 3
Pages 425-448
Publication Electoral Studies
Date 2003-09-01T00:00:00///
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(01)00057-9
Library Catalog IngentaConnect
Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of distinct institutional rules on choices of electoral strategies made by legislators in the 1998 Brazilian elections. Two types of constraints were assessed. The first set refers to pressures created by the Brazilian open-list proportional representation electoral system that tends to personalize the vote. The second emerges from the centralizing effect of the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, which shift bargaining power from the individualized incumbent to party leaders and to the President, basically due to their control of the Chamber’s agenda and discretion over the allocation of public funds. We find that both institutional settings influence the outcomes of elections, but that constituency interests appear to be a stronger constraint to legislator’s choice of electoral strategies.
Title Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author Torsten Persson
URL http://www.qjps.com/prod.aspx?product=QJPS&doi=100.00006019
Volume 2
Issue 2
Pages 155-188
Publication Quarterly Journal of Political Science
ISSN 15540634
Date 2007-05-04
DOI 10.1561/100.00006019
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.
Title Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Type Book
Author Torsten Persson
Author Guido Enrico Tabellini
Publisher MIT Press
ISBN 9780262661317
Date 2002-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.Combining the best of three separate traditions–the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science–Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
# of Pages 564
Title Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Torsten Persson
Author Gérard Roland
Author Guido Tabellini
URL http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/112/4/1163
Volume 112
Issue 4
Pages 1163-1202
Publication The Quarterly Journal of Economics
ISSN 0033-5533, 1531-4650
Date 11/01/1997
Journal Abbr The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/003355300555457
Library Catalog qje.oxfordjournals.org
Language en
Abstract Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters’ advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.
Title Comparative Politics and Public Finance
Type Report
Author Torsten Persson
Author Gerard Roland
Author Guido Tabellini
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/igi/igierp/114.html
Institution IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University
Report Type Working Paper
Library Catalog RePEc – IDEAS
Abstract We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.
Report Number 114
Title Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral Countries?
Type Book
Author Susan J. Pharr
Author Robert D. Putnam
Publisher Princeton University Press
ISBN 0691049246
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract It is a notable irony that as democracy replaces other forms of governing throughout the world, citizens of the most established and prosperous democracies (the United States and Canada, Western European nations, and Japan) increasingly report dissatisfaction and frustration with their governments. Here, some of the most influential political scientists at work today examine why this is so in a volume unique in both its publication of original data and its conclusion that low public confidence in democratic leaders and institutions is a function of actual performance, changing expectations, and the role of information. The culmination of research projects directed by Robert Putnam through the Trilateral Commission and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, these papers present new data that allow more direct comparisons across national borders and more detailed pictures of trends within countries than previously possible. They show that citizen disaffection in the Trilateral democracies is not the result of frayed social fabric, economic insecurity, the end of the Cold War, or public cynicism. Rather, the contributors conclude, the trouble lies with governments and politics themselves. The sources of the problem include governments’ diminished capacity to act in an interdependent world and a decline in institutional performance, in combination with new public expectations and uses of information that have altered the criteria by which people judge their governments. Although the authors diverge in approach, ideological affinity, and interpretation, they adhere to a unified framework and confine themselves to the last quarter of the twentieth century. This focus–together with the wealth of original research results and the uniform strength of the individual chapters–sets the volume above other efforts to address the important and increasingly international question of public dissatisfaction with democratic governance.
# of Pages 392
Title The Politics of Presence
Type Book
Author Anne Phillips
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780198279426
Date 1995-10-05
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 221
Title Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance
Type Journal Article
Author Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2004.00109.x
Volume 27
Issue 3
Pages 335-342
Publication Scandinavian Political Studies
ISSN 0080-6757, 1467-9477
Date 09/2004
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2004.00109.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The concept of ‘representation’ is puzzling not because it lacks a central definition, but because that definition implies a paradox (being present and yet not present) and is too general to help reconcile the word’s many senses with their sometimes conflicting implications. Representation has a problematic relationship with democracy, with which it is often thoughtlessly equated. The two ideas have different, even conflicting, origins. Democracy came from ancient Greece and was won through struggle, from below. Greek democracy was participatory and bore no relationship to representation. Representation dates – at least as a political concept and practice – from the late medieval period, when it was imposed as a duty by the monarch. Only in the English Civil War and then in the eighteenth-century democratic revolutions did the two concepts become linked. Democrats saw representation – with an extended suffrage – as making possible large-scale democracy. Conservatives instead saw it as a tool for staving off democracy. Rousseau also contrasted the two concepts, but favoured democratic self-government. He was prescient in seeing representation as a threat to democracy. Representative government has become a new form of oligarchy, with ordinary people excluded from public life. This is not inevitable. Representation does make large-scale democracy possible, where it is based in participatory democratic politics at the local level. Three obstacles block access to this possibility today: the scope of public problems and private power; money, or rather wealth; and ideas and their shaping, in an age of electronic media.
Title The Concept of Representation
Type Book
Author Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
Publisher University of California Press
ISBN 9780520021563
Date 1967-01-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 340
Title Representation is Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author David Plotke
URL http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111%2F1467-8675.00033
Volume 4
Issue 1
Pages 19-34
Publication Constellations
ISSN 1351-0487, 1467-8675
Date 04/1997
DOI 10.1111/1467-8675.00033
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract During the Cold War, arguments about representation were a significant part of international debates about democracy. Proponents of minimal democracy dominated these arguments, and their thin notions of representation became political common sense. I propose a view of representation that differs from the main views advocated during the Cold War. Representation has a central positive role in democratic politics: I gain political representation when my authorized representative tries to achieve my political aims, subject to dialogue about those aims and to the use of mutually acceptable procedures for gaining them. Thus the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is exclusion – and the opposite of participation is abstention. Rather than opposing participation to representation, we should try to improve representative practices and forms to make them more open, effective, and fair.
Title Trust in Politicians as a Factor Influencing Choice in Presidential Elections: High Expectations and Disappointing Reality
Type Journal Article
Author Natalia Pohorila
Author Yuriy Taran
Author Oleksandra Johnson
Volume 35
Issue 2
Pages 85-96
Publication International Journal of Sociology
Date 2005
Abstract High expectations of the political elite run parallel with disappointment and distrust of politicians. Reasons for low trust of political leaders involve the combination of two different criteria for estimating politicians: instrumental or axiological. This article presents an attempt to analyze factors of electoral choice and to classify them as instrumental or axiological. The analysis is based on data from several surveys conducted in Ukraine.
Title Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change
Type Journal Article
Author Grigore Pop-Eleches
URL http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00598.x
Volume 69
Issue 4
Pages 908-926
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 11/2007
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00598.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article shows that post-communist regime trajectories have been largely circumscribed by historical legacy differences, but the question about which particular legacy matters most is much harder to answer, since statistical results are sensitive to model specification and to the choice of democracy indicator. While some of these discrepancies reflect the inherent limitations of traditional statistical methods, others reflect the different dimensions of democracy captured by different indicators. Therefore, the article contributes to a more nuanced explanation of post-communist democratization by showing that different legacies drive different aspects of democratization. Finally, the results demonstrate that several prominent alternative explanations-initial election outcomes, institutional choices, geographic diffusion, and external conditionality-played a relatively modest role in explaining democratization patterns beyond the constraints imposed by historical legacies.
Title Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions
Type Book
Author G. Bingham Powell
Publisher Yale University Press
ISBN 9780300080162
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract In this book, a leading scholar of comparative politics explores elections as instruments of democracy. Focusing on elections in twenty democracies over the past quarter century, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., examines the differences between two great visions of democracy — the majoritarian vision, in which citizens use the election process to choose decisively between two competing teams of policymakers, providing the winner with the concentrated power to make public policy; and the proportional influence vision, in which citizens use elections to choose political agents to represent their views in postelection bargaining, thereby dispersing power. Powell asks crucial questions for modern democracies: Which vision best serves as an instrument of democracy? What are the reasons and conditions under which each vision succeeds or fails?Careful analyses of more than 150 democratic elections show that each vision succeeds fairly well on its own terms in responsively linking election outcomes to policymaker selection, although advantages and limitations must be traded off. However, Powell concludes, the proportional influence vision and its designs enjoy a clear advantage in creating policy congruence between citizens and their policymakers — a finding that should give pause to those who are attracted to the idea of the decisive election as a direct tool for citizen control.
# of Pages 316
Title POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Type Journal Article
Author G. Bingham Powell
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815
Volume 7
Issue 1
Pages 273-296
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 2004-05-17
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104815
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Two large research programs have analyzed election-based connections between citizens and policy makers in different democracies. Studies of vote-seat representation in the tradition of Rae (1967) begin with citizens’ party votes and have made substantial progress in elucidating the impact of election laws, geographic vote distributions, and the number of parties and their interactions on the proportionality of party representation. Studies of substantive representation in the tradition of Miller & Stokes (1963) begin with citizen issue preferences and link these to the positions of their representatives. Most studies outside the United States, confronting multimember districts and the cohesion of party representatives, have focused on voter-party dyads rather than geographic constituencies, and confirmed the importance of issues linked to a common electoral discourse and the greater structure of legislator issue positions. Recently, a number of explicitly comparative analyses have begun to analyze collective correspondence and confront other limitations of the literature.
Title A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context
Type Journal Article
Author G. Bingham Powell
Author Guy D. Whitten
URL http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2111378?uid=3738840&uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103490615901
Volume 37
Issue 2
Pages 391
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 00925853
Date 05/1993
DOI 10.2307/2111378
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract A large literature has demonstrated that such economic factors as growth, inflation, and unemployment affect the popularity of incumbents within many democratic countries. However, cross-national aggregate analyses of “economic voting” show only weak and inconsistent economic effects. We argue for the systematic incorporation of political factors that shape the electoral consequences of economic performance. Multivariate analyses of 102 elections in 19 industrialized democracies are used to estimate the cross-national impact of economic and political factors. The analyses show that considerations of the ideological image of the government, its electoral base, and the clarity of its political responsibility are essential to understanding the effects of economic conditions on voting for or against incumbents.
Title Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland
Type Journal Article
Author Denise V. Powers
Author James H. Cox
URL http://www.jstor.org/(….)
Volume 91
Issue 3
Pages 617
Publication The American Political Science Review
ISSN 00030554
Date 09/1997
DOI 10.2307/2952078
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Kenneth Prewitt
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1955609?origin=crossref
Volume 64
Issue 1
Pages 5
Publication The American Political Science Review
ISSN 00030554
Date 03/1970
DOI 10.2307/1955609
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Public Support for Economic Reforms in Poland
Type Journal Article
Author Adam Przeworski
URL http://cps.sagepub.com/content/29/5/520
Volume 29
Issue 5
Pages 520-543
Publication Comparative Political Studies
ISSN 0010-4140, 1552-3829
Date 10/01/1996
Journal Abbr Comparative Political Studies
DOI 10.1177/0010414096029005002
Library Catalog cps.sagepub.com
Language en
Abstract Using monthly surveys, the author examines the impact of aggregate economic conditions on the dynamic of support for the Polish program of economic reforms, the Balcerowicz Plan. To highlight the ambiguity of the standard retrospective model, the author analyzes the impact of subjective perceptions of economic conditions on postures toward the reform program, asking if people were extrapolating the past when forming predictions about the future. Then the effect of these predictions on the postures toward reform is studied. Finally, the author focuses on the distributional effects. Substantive conclusions concerning the impact of economic conditions on the support of economic reform programs under democracy close the article.
Title Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
Type Book
Author Adam Przeworski
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521423359
Date 1991-07-26
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a worldwide movement toward political democracy and economic rationality. Never have so many people experimented with democratic institutions. At the same time, traditional strategies of economic development have collapsed in Eastern Europe and Latin America and entire economic systems are being transformed on both continents. What should we expect in the countries that venture on the paths to democracy and markets? Will these transitions result in democracies or in new dictatorships? What economic system, new or old, will emerge? This major book analyzes recent events in Eastern Europe and Latin America, focusing on transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms. The author underscores the interdependence of political and economic transformations and draws on extensive local data as part of his analysis. A distinctive feature of the book is that it employs models derived from politics, economics, and game theory. This book will be of particular interest to scholars and graduate students in political science and sociology.
# of Pages 230
Title Democracy, accountability, and representation
Type Book
Editor Adam Przeworski
Editor Susan Carol Stokes
Editor Bernard Manin
Series Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy
Place Cambridge, U.K. ; New York
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 0521641535
Date 1999
Call Number JC423 .D43946 1999
Library Catalog Library of Congress ISBN
Abstract This book examines whether mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.
# of Pages 351
Title Radical-right narratives in Slovakia and Hungary: historical legacies, mythic overlaying and contemporary politics
Type Journal Article
Author Bartek Pytlas
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0031322X.2013.786199
Volume 47
Issue 2
Pages 162-183
Publication Patterns of Prejudice
ISSN 0031-322X, 1461-7331
Date 05/2013
DOI 10.1080/0031322X.2013.786199
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In the last several years, radical-right rhetoric has gained further ground in the political discourse of Slovakia and Hungary. This increasingly overt spiral of tension has been fuelled not only by radical-right actors, such as the Slovenska narodna strana (SNS, Slovak National Party) and Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary), but also by mainstream parties such as SMER in Slovakia and Fidesz in Hungary. The legitimizing radical-right frames have mostly been founded on politicized historical narratives related to the intertwined processes of nation- and state-building in both countries. Pytlas seeks to describe and analyse this phenomenon, focusing on historical legacies, their mythologized reinterpretations as well as their application to contemporary politics. The debates on the Slovak language law of 2009 and the Hungarian citizenship law of 2010 shall be used as empirical examples of this mythic overlaying’ mechanism.
Title Towards a General Theory of Political Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Andrew Rehfeld
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381600005521
Volume 68
Issue 01
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2008-7-29
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00365.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Nondemocratic “representatives” increasingly act on the global stage, as “representatives” of their dictatorships to the United Nations, or when an NGO represents prisoners of war. Standard accounts of political representation depend upon democratic institutions (like elections) and a certain kind of proper activity (like deliberation and constituent accountability) and thus cannot explain how these people are representatives at all. I argue that the standard account of political representation is thus inadequate to explain political representation throughout the globe. I offer a general theory of political representation which explains representation simply by reference to a relevant audience accepting a person as such. When audiences use democratic rules of recognition, the familiar cases arise. When audiences use nondemocratic rules of recognition, nondemocratic cases arise. The result is that political representation, per se, is not a democratic phenomenon at all. The account offers a more parsimonious explanation of political representation, providing a tool for analysis of political representation throughout the globe.
Title Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author Andrew Rehfeld
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055409090261
Volume 103
Issue 02
Pages 214
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2009-6-16
DOI 10.1017/S0003055409090261
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The trustee/delegate problem purportedly expresses how closely a representative’s votes in the legislature should correspond to their constituents’ preferences. In this article, I argue that the usual formulation of this debate collapses three distinctions-aims, source of judgment, and responsiveness-and thus obscures the underlying complexity of the phenomenon. Given its tripartite formulation, the collapse of these distinctions into a binary “trustee/delegate” formulation obscures a more complex political landscape with eight-rather than two-ideal types. Furthermore, once unpacked, we can see that the distinctions operate entirely independent of the location of authority, leading to the seemingly paradoxical instructed trustees and independent delegates. I also claim that the three distinctions apply to any decision maker, and thus, the attribution of this problem as distinctive of democratic political representation is an important overstatement. The article thus contributes to a more general theory of political representation that can be applied in nonelectoral and nondemocratic contexts increasingly relevant to global politics.
Title The Concept of Constituency
Type Book
Author Andrew Rehfeld
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9781139446488
Date 2005
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 279
Title Democratic Autonomy : Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy
Type Book
Author Henry S. Richardson
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780199760794
Date 2002-09-05
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract What would our decision-making procedures look like if they were actually guided by the much-discussed concept of “deliberative democracy”? What does rule by the people for the people entail? And how can a modern government’s reliance on administrative agencies be reconciled with this populist ideal? What form must democratic reasoning take in the modern administrative state? Democratic Autonomy squarely faces these challenges to the deliberative democratic ideal. It identifies processes of reasoning that avert bureaucratic domination and bring diverse people into political agreement. To bridge our differences intelligently, Richardson argues, we cannot rely on instrumentalist approaches to policy reasoning, such as cost-benefit analysis. Instead, citizens must arrive at reasonable compromises through fair, truth-oriented processes of deliberation. Using examples from programs as diverse as disability benefits and environmental regulation, he shows how the administrative policy-making necessary to carrying out most legislation can be part of our deciding what to do. Opposing both those liberal theorists who have attacked the populist ideal and those neo-republican theorists who have given up on it, Richardson builds an account of popular rule that is sensitive to the challenges to public deliberation that arise from relying on liberal constitutional guarantees, representative institutions, majority rule, and administrative rulemaking. Written in a nontechnical style and engaged with practical issues of everyday politics, this highly original and rigorous restatement of what democracy entails is essential reading for political theorists, philosophers, public choice theorists, constitutional and administrative lawyers, and policy analysts.
# of Pages 332
Title Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Andrew Roberts
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379408000218
Volume 27
Issue 3
Pages 533-546
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 9/2008
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2008.01.008
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Are citizens in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe able to hold politicians accountable at elections? The inheritance of communism-disengaged citizens, economic flux, and inchoate party systems-might be expected to weaken accountability. Looking at the results of 34elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper finds instead a phenomenon that it calls hyperaccountability. Incumbents are held accountable for economic performance-particularly for unemployment-but this accountability distinguishes not between vote losses and gains, but between large and small losses. This result is significant in several respects. The evidence for economic voting restores some faith in the ability of voters to control their representatives in new democracies. The consistency of punishment in the region, however, may mitigate some of the benefits of economic voting. If incumbents know they will lose, then they may decide to enrich themselves when in power rather than produce good policies. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title Representation in Political Theory and in Law
Type Journal Article
Author Ronald Rogowski
Volume 91
Issue 3
Pages 395–430
Publication Ethics
Date 1981
Library Catalog PhilPapers
Title Extraordinary politics in the Polish transition
Type Journal Article
Author Amanda Rose
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0967067X99000082
Volume 32
Issue 2
Pages 195-210
Publication Communist and Post-Communist Studies
ISSN 0967067X
Date 6/1999
DOI 10.1016/S0967-067X(99)00008-2
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Among the arguments for rapid economic reform in transitions to the market in Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have argued that rapid reformers could better take advantage of the period of ‘extraordinary politics’ at the beginning of the transition. Regime transitions provide a unique opportunity for politicians to implement economic reform since the public is more likely to grant the government room to reform. If the public is more likely to give politicians this window of opportunity, politicians should implement far-reaching reforms during that period. I test two propositions in this paper: (1) politicians in office during a period of liberalization will get high positive ratings at the polls which will gradually deplete over time; and (2) at the beginning of the transition, views of the current economic situation will not predict views of politics. I find that approval of the Polish government was unusually high in the first one and one-half to two years of the Polish transition. In the same period, assessments of the current economic situation only weakly affected assessments of politics. After the period of extraordinary politics comes to an end, the relationship between political and economic assessments is much stronger, Thus, in a country with a harsh economic reform program and six contentious national elections within eight years, then is strong evidence that politicians benefited from a period of extraordinary politics at the beginning of the regime. (C) 1999 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title From Elections to Democracy in Central Europe: Public Participation and the Role of Civil Society
Type Journal Article
Author S. Rose-Ackerman
URL http://eep.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0888325406297132
Volume 21
Issue 1
Pages 31-47
Publication East European Politics & Societies
ISSN 0888-3254
Date 2007-02-01
DOI 10.1177/0888325406297132
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The new European Union member states in Eastern Europe do not have fully consolidated democracies. True, popularly elected legislatures are responsible for lawmaking, and citizens can challenge the case-by-case implementation of the law. But most statutes are not self-implementing. Before they can be put into effect, governments need to issue general regulations and guidelines that add specificity to the statutory scheme. At present, this type of government policy making often is not democratically accountable. Procedures inside government lack transparency and accountability, and organized civil society groups that are engaged in advocacy and oversight are few in number and often weakly institutionalized. The Central European experience has lessons for countries further to the east that are poorer and less democratic. Here, full-fledged public participation in the government rule making may not be feasible, but other aspects of the transition to democracy in Central Europe may provide relevant models-for instance, external pressure, government oversight institutions, and grassroots democracy.
Title The Social Contract
Type Book
Author Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Publisher Penguin Books, Limited
ISBN 9780141018881
Date 2004
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Rousseau’s explosive cry for human liberty helped to spark the French Revolution and has haunted our discussions of how we should rule one another ever since seen as both a blueprint for political terror and as a fundamental statement for democracy.
# of Pages 167
Title Accountability in an Unequal World
Type Journal Article
Author Jennifer Rubenstein
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381600005843
Volume 69
Issue 03
Publication The Journal of Politics
ISSN 0022-3816, 1468-2508
Date 2008-7-29
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00563.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract According to the “standard model” of accountability, holding another actor accountable entails sanctioning that actor if it fails to fulfill its obligations without a justification or excuse. Less powerful actors therefore cannot hold more powerful actors accountable, because they cannot sanction more powerful actors. Because inequality appears unlikely to disappear soon, there is a pressing need for “second-best” forms of accountability: forms that are feasible under conditions of inequality, but deliver as many of the benefits of standard accountability as possible. This article describes a model of second-best accountability that fits this description, which I call “surrogate accountability.” I argue that surrogate accountability can provide some of the benefits of standard accountability, but not others, that it should be evaluated according to different normative criteria than standard accountability, and that, while surrogate accountability has some benefits that standard accountability lacks, it is usually normatively inferior to standard accountability.
Title Who’s Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions
Type Journal Article
Author Thomas J. Rudolph
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1540-5907.00049
Volume 47
Issue 4
Pages 698-713
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 0092-5853, 1540-5907
Date 10/2003
DOI 10.1111/1540-5907.00049
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The concept of responsibility lies at the heart of theories of democratic accountability. This article represents the first attempt to explicitly model attributions of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economy. The article investigates the extent to which contextual and individual-level factors influence citizens’ attributions of responsibility for the economy and how, in turn, such judgments shape their political evaluations. Employing a multinomial probit model of attributional choice, I find that responsibility judgments are shaped to varying degrees by economic ideology, perceptions of institutional context, and partisanship, although the effects of partisanship are not uniform across political parties. The results demonstrate that responsibility attributions are politically consequential and moderate the effects of economic perceptions on presidential and congressional approval. Finally, the results suggest that the effects of responsibility attributions in the sanctioning process are not invariant across the target of institutional evaluation.
Title Democratic regimes and accountability for the economy in comparative perspective
Type Conference Paper
Author David Samuels
Author Timothy Hellwig
Place Chicago
Date 2004
Conference Name Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Title Democratic Theory: Based on the Author’s Translation of Democrazia E Definizione, 2nd Ed.,Il Mulino, Bologna, 1958
Type Book
Author Giovanni Sartori
Publisher Praeger
Date 1965
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 479
Title Party System Polarisation and Government Duration in Central and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Lee Savage
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2013.797239
Volume 36
Issue 5
Pages 1029-1051
Publication West European Politics
ISSN 0140-2382, 1743-9655
Date 09/2013
DOI 10.1080/01402382.2013.797239
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, more than 60 per cent of governments in Central and Eastern Europe have terminated prematurely. This article argues that the character of party system development in the region has facilitated the emergence of a polarised pattern of party competition and that competition for government now takes place in distinct ideological blocs. Parties seek to form governments within these blocs but not across them and therefore there is little incentive to defect from a governing coalition due to the lack of viable alternatives. As a result, more polarised party systems produce more durable governments. The empirical evidence shows that polarisation and ideological diversity of the government are significant indicators of government duration in Central and Eastern Europe. Ideologically compact governments formed within narrow blocs in the party system survive longer than ideologically diverse coalitions that emerge from less polarised party systems.
Title The Representative Claim
Type Book
Author Michael Saward
Publisher OUP Oxford
ISBN 9780199579389
Date 2010-05-13
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Representation is more than a matter of elections and parties. This book offers a radical new perspective on the subject. Representation, it argues, is all around us, a dynamic practise across societies rather than simply a fixed feature of government. At the heart of the argument is the straightforward but versatile notion of the representative claim. People claim to speak or stand for others in multiple, shifting, and surprising patterns. At the same time they offer images oftheir constituents and audiences as artists paint portraits. Who can speak for and about us in this volatile world of representations? Which representative claims can have democratic legitimacy? The Representative Claim is set to transform our core assumptions about what representation is and canbe. At a time when political representation is widely believed to be in crisis, the book provides a timely and critical corrective to conventional wisdom on the present and potential future of representative democracy.
# of Pages 218
Title The Representative Claim
Type Journal Article
Author Michael Saward
URL http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cpt/journal/v5/n3/abs/9300234a.html
Volume 5
Issue 3
Pages 297-318
Publication Contemporary Political Theory
ISSN 1470-8914
Date 2006
Journal Abbr Cont Pol Theory
DOI 10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300234
Library Catalog http://www.palgrave-journals.com
Language en
Abstract Recent work on the idea of political representation has challenged effectively orthodox accounts of constituency and interests. However, discussions of representation need to focus more on its dynamics prior to further work on its forms. To that end, the idea of the representative claim is advanced and defended. Focusing on the representative claim helps us to: link aesthetic and cultural representation with political representation; grasp the importance of performance to representation; take non-electoral representation seriously; and to underline the contingency and contestability of all forms of representation. The article draws upon a range of sources and ideas to sketch a new, broader and more complex picture of the representative claim which — despite the complexity — helps us to reconnect representation theory to pressing real-world challenges.
Title Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets
Type Journal Article
Author Petra Schleiter
Author Edward Morgan-Jones
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055409990062
Volume 103
Issue 03
Pages 496
Publication American Political Science Review
ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943
Date 2009-8-17
DOI 10.1017/S0003055409990062
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Some European constitutions give cabinets great discretion to manage their own demise, whereas others limit their choices and insert the head of state into decisions about government termination. In this article, we map the tremendous variation in the constitutional rules that govern cabinet termination and test existing expectations about its effects on a government’s survival and mode of termination. In doing so, we use the most extensive government survival data set available to date, the first to include East and West European governments. Our results demonstrate that constitutional constraints on governments and presidential influence on cabinet termination are much more common than has previously been understood and have powerful effects on the hazard profiles of governments. These results alter and improve the discipline’s understanding of government termination and durability, and have implications for comparative work in a range of areas, including the survival and performance of democracies, electoral accountability, opportunistic election calling, and political business cycles.
Title Liberalization, transition and consolidation: measuring the components of democratization
Type Journal Article
Author Carsten Q. Schneider
Author Philippe C. Schmitter
URL http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340412000287271
Volume 11
Issue 5
Pages 59-90
Publication Democratization
ISSN 1351-0347, 1743-890X
Date 12/2004
DOI 10.1080/13510340412000287271
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article measures the process of democratization by subdividing it into three components: the liberalization of autocracy, the mode of transition and the consolidation of democracy. The 30 or so countries included in the study are situated in different world regions, mainly southern and eastern Europe, south and central America and the former Soviet Union – all of which have experienced regime transitions since 1974. The study also includes a sample of countries from the Middle East and northern Africa that are, at best, only in an embryonic stage of liberalization. Measured by scalograms, the data provide comparative indicators of the progress each country has achieved over the period 1974-2000. The study tests this time series for ‘patterns’, guided by the hypothesis that the multiple dimensions of liberalization, transition and consolidation are consistently related to each other, both temporally and spatially. The findings indicate a single underlying dimensional structure to the data. This allows separate scales for liberalization and consolidation to be created and combined into a general indicator of democratization. Contrary to expectations in the literature, most central and eastern European countries perform comparatively better than the southern European and Latin American cases. Not only do they reach the same high levels of liberalization and consolidation, but they also do so in a much shorter time span. Furthermore, there is compelling evidence in the Middle Eastern and North African data that the liberalization of autocratic regimes does not always play a democratization triggering role.
Title Reducing complexity in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Remote and proximate factors and the consolidation of democracy
Type Journal Article
Author Carsten Q. Schneider
Author Claudius Wagemann
URL http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00635.x/abstract
Volume 45
Issue 5
Pages 751–786
Publication European Journal of Political Research
ISSN 1475-6765
Date 2006
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00635.x
Library Catalog Wiley Online Library
Language en
Abstract Abstract. Comparative methods based on set theoretic relationships such as ‘fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis’ (fs/QCA) represent a useful tool for dealing with complex causal hypotheses in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions under the constraint of a medium-sized number of cases. However, real-world research situations might make the application of fs/QCA difficult in two respects – namely, the complexity of the results and the phenomenon of limited diversity. We suggest a two-step approach as one possibility to mitigate these problems. After introducing the difference between remote and proximate factors, the application of a two-step fs/QCA approach is demonstrated analyzing the causes of the consolidation of democracy. We find that different paths lead to consolidation, but all are characterized by a fit of the institutional mix chosen to the societal context in terms of power dispersion. Hence, we demonstrate that the application of fs/QCA in a two-step manner helps to formulate and test equifinal and conjunctural hypotheses in medium-size N comparative analyses, and thus to contribute to an enhanced understanding of social phenomena.
Title Political stability, corruption and trust in politicians
Type Journal Article
Author Ingmar Schumacher
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0264999312004038
Volume 31
Pages 359-369
Publication Economic Modelling
ISSN 02649993
Date 3/2013
DOI 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.047
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In this article we develop a dynamic model where an endogenous evolution of trust impacts a politician’s choice for bribe-taking and tax re-distribution. The politician obtains utility from net income that comes from his wage income, tax embezzlements and bribe-taking, and he also has incentives for tax re-distribution. The higher the tax embezzlements and the more bribes the politician takes the lower his citizens’ trust and the less likely will he be re-elected. We support the evolution of trust with an econometric investigation.

We analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions, and find that withholding taxes and taking bribes may be complements or substitutes for a politician, depending on the politician’s incentives for tax re-distribution. Without these incentives, tax embezzlement and bribe taking are necessarily substitutes. With sufficiently strong incentives, we find re-distribution and bribe-taking may become complements. Complements implies that the politician, at least partly, increases bribe-taking because this allows him to increase re-distribution, which aids his additional motives for tax re-distribution.

Based on comparative statics at steady state we also find that the higher the politician’s wage the lower the bribe-taking and the higher the trust; stronger social capital leads to less bribe-taking and higher levels of trust; improvements in electoral accountability induce a decrease in bribing while trust increases. (C)

Title Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
Type Book
Author Joseph Alois Schumpeter
Publisher Routledge
ISBN 9780415107624
Date 1976
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy remains one of the greatest works of social theory written this century. When it first appeared the New English Weekly predicted that `for the next five to ten years it will cetainly remain a work with which no one who professes any degree of information on sociology or economics can afford to be unacquainted.’ Fifty years on, this prediction seems a little understated.Why has the work endured so well? Schumpeter’s contention that the seeds of capitalism’s decline were internal, and his equal and opposite hostility to centralist socialism have perplexed, engaged and infuriated readers since the book’s publication. By refusing to become an advocate for either position Schumpeter was able both to make his own great and original contribution and to clear the way for a more balanced consideration of the most important social movements of his and our time.
# of Pages 920
Title Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model
Type Journal Article
Author Paul Seabright
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0014292195000550
Volume 40
Issue 1
Pages 61-89
Publication European Economic Review
ISSN 00142921
Date 1/1996
DOI 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00055-0
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts. The model of the paper compares allocations of power to local, central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens. Centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability, which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re-election of the government. The model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions, and externalities between central and local governments in a federation. It is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities, and to circumstances where governments may act as Leviathans appropriating resources for their own use.
Title Voters’ perceptions of government performance and attributions of responsibility: Electoral control in Poland
Type Journal Article
Author Goldie Shabad
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0261379411000084
Volume 30
Issue 2
Pages 309-320
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 02613794
Date 6/2011
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.10.002
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We test the claim that elections function as a mechanism of accountability in the case of Poland, a new democracy with a fluid party system. We ask whether individuals’ vote intentions are based on assessments of governing parties’ performance. Taking into consideration attributions of responsibility for such performance, accountability exists if assessments of poor performance decrease the probability of voting for a ruling party. We use two criteria of performance: perceived change in unemployment rate and level of corruption between two consecutive elections. Using data from the Polish POLPAN panel survey, our results confirm the existence of a heterogeneous sanctioning model. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Title Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis
Type Journal Article
Author Goldie Shabad
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
URL http://cps.sagepub.com/content/32/6/690
Volume 32
Issue 6
Pages 690-723
Publication Comparative Political Studies
ISSN 0010-4140, 1552-3829
Date 09/01/1999
Journal Abbr Comparative Political Studies
DOI 10.1177/0010414099032006002
Library Catalog cps.sagepub.com
Language en
Abstract The basic premise of this article is that, contrary to the tabula rasa hypothesis, individuals in the new democracies of post-Communist Eastern Europe have been able to form meaningful political identities even under conditions of great fluidity and uncertainty. These identities are expressed through the pattern of voting choices that individuals make during successive elections. The authors based their analysis on a 1993 panel survey of a national sample of the adult Polish population first interviewed in 1988. They show that when political identity is conceptualized in a dynamic manner, the majority of the Polish electorate exhibit patterns of electoral choice that conform well to interpretable types of political identity. Such political identities are shaped by social group memberships and individuals’ experiences under communism. These identities, in turn, shape individuals’ orientations toward crucial issues related to the systemic transformation of their society.
Title Inter-Party Mobility among Parliamentary Candidates in Post-Communist East Central Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Goldie Shabad
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/10/2/151
Volume 10
Issue 2
Pages 151-176
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688, 1460-3683
Date 03/01/2004
Journal Abbr Party Politics
DOI 10.1177/1354068804040498
Library Catalog ppq.sagepub.com
Language en
Abstract The development of stable partisan commitments among political elites is crucial for party-system institutionalization in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. Little is known, however, about the partisan behavior of those who compete for national office. This study begins to fill this gap through an analysis of inter-party mobility among all candidates who ran for the lower house of parliament in two pairs of consecutive elections in Poland (1991–3 and 1993–7) and in three pairs of consecutive elections in the Czech Republic (1990–2, 1992–6 and 1996–8). We consider the overall extent of inter-party mobility, structural versus voluntary components of mobility, patterns of movement between types of parties and electoral payoffs of stable and shifting partisan affiliations. Although the overall rate of party-switching has declined substantially in the Czech Republic but not in Poland, changes in other characteristics of inter-party mobility indicate that party-system institutionalization is taking place in both countries.
Title The Emergence of Career Politicians in Post-Communist Democracies: Poland and the Czech Republic
Type Journal Article
Author Goldie Shabad
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.2307/3598567
Volume 27
Issue 3
Pages 333
Publication Legislative Studies Quarterly
ISSN 03629805
Date 08/2002
DOI 10.2307/3598567
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Despite party system fluidity and high rates of electoral volatility in the first decade after the transition to democracy in Poland and the Czech Republic, career politicians are emerging. Using data on all parliamentary candidates in the last election before the fall of communism and in all elections since then, we show that, in both countries, parliamentary carryover rates have risen substantially, a growing number of incumbents are seeking reelection, and an increasing proportion of candidates for legislative office have competed in previous parliamentary elections. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior political experience has a persistent and positive effect on winning office. We argue that the rise of career politicians facilitates the consolidation and effectiveness of these new democracies.
Title Varieties of Electoral Control
Type Journal Article
Author W. Phillips Shively
URL http://www.idunn.no/ts/tfs/2004/02/varieties_of_electoral_control
Volume 45
Issue 02
Pages 409-418
Publication Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning
ISSN 1504-291X;0040-716X
Date 2004/09/24
Library Catalog http://www.idunn.no
Abstract I distinguish regimes of electoral control along two dimensions: the agent of control and whether control is exercised through selection or accountability, a conceptual analysis that yields six different types of electoral control and emphasizes their complex interrelationships. It is not clear in theory how electoral systems will affect the choice among regimes of electoral control. In particular, it is not the case that majoritarian systems will necessarily foster accountability or that proportional systems will necessarily foster selection; the effect of electoral systems on electoral control is complex, and the particular mix of controls in any system must be a subject of empirical investigation.
Title Challengers, Democratic Contestation, and Electoral Accountability
Type Report
Author Kenneth Shotts
Author Scott Ashworth
URL http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1901510
Place Rochester, NY
Date 2011
Institution Social Science Research Network
Report Type SSRN Scholarly Paper
Library Catalog papers.ssrn.com
Abstract In most models of electoral accountability, the “challenger” is simply a passive replacement. We develop a model in which the challenger can actively criticize the incumbent’s policy choices, and we use this model to analyze whether voters can use the challenger’s critiques to enhance the incumbent’s incentives to choose correct policies. If the challenger’s information is soft, then challenger critiques are irrelevant, but if the challenger can obtain hard information the voter can use this information to discipline the incumbent. We extend our model to analyze selection concerns, the incumbency advantage, and incumbents’ decisions about whether to focus on making policy or on generating public justifications for their policy choices.
Report Number ID 1901510
Title Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
Type Book
Author Matthew Soberg Shugart
Author John M. Carey
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521429900
Date 1992-08-28
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. A virtual consensus has formed around the argument that parliamentary systems are preferable overall to presidential systems, due largely to the loss of power to the executive and assembly in presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on recent developments in the theoretical literature about institutional design and electoral rules. They develop a typology of democratic regimes that are structured around the separation of powers principle, including two hybrid forms, the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, and they evaluate a number of alternative ways of balancing powers between the branches within these basic frameworks. They also demonstrate that electoral rules are critically important in determining how authority can be exercised within these systems, describing the range of electoral rules that can be instituted and the effects they have on the shape of party systems, on the political agenda, and on the prospects for cooperation between presidents and assemblies.
# of Pages 334
Title Mixed-Member Electoral Systems : The Best of Both Worlds?
Type Book
Author Matthew Shugart
Author Martin P. Wattenberg
Publisher Oxford University Press
ISBN 9780191528972
Date 2001-02-01
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Mixed-member electoral systems may well be the electoral reform of the 21st century. In the view of many electoral reformers, mixed systems offer the best of both the traditional British single-seat district system and PR systems. This book seeks to evaluate: why these systems have recently appealed to many countries with diverse electoral histories; and how well expectations for these systems have been met. – ;Mixed-member electoral systems may well be the electoral reform of the 21st century. In the view of many electoral reformers, mixed-member systems offer the best of both the traditional British single-seat district system and PR systems. This book seeks to evaluate: why mixed-member systems have recently appealed to many countries with diverse electoral histories; and how well expectations for these systems have been met. Each major country, which has adopted a mixed system thus, has two chapters in this book, one on origins and one on consequences. These countries are Germany, New Zealand, Italy, Israel, Japan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Mexico, Hungary, and Russia. In addition, there are also chapters on the prospects for a mixed-member system being adopted in Britain and Canada, respectively. The material presented suggests that mixed-member systems have been largely successful thus far. They appear to be more likely than most other electoral systems to generate two-bloc party systems, without in the process reducing minor parties to insignificance. In addition, they are more likely than any other class of electoral system to simultaneously generate local accountability as well as a nationally-oriented party system. Mixed-member electoral systems have now joined majoritarian and proportional systems as basic options which must be considered whenever electoral systems are designed or redesigned. Such a development represents a fundamental change in thinking about electoral systems around the world. – ;An important and timely contribution … an excellent reference book that provides unique and extensive coverage of a diverse range of cases. – Japanese Journal of Political Science;The book provides a useful classification of some electoral system elements in two dimensions: inter-party (majoritarian vs. proportional) and intra-party (candidates vs. parties dominance), as well as ten single-country good reading studies. – West European Politics;The core of the book, especially the section on how MMP systems came to be introduced in the ten case study countries, will have lasting value for its detail … the editors’ contributions are excellent: they have done much more than simply collate a series of chapters. As a whole, the book will provide an important reference work for the study of what, in their words, ‘might prove to be the electoral reform of the twenty-first century’. – Representation
# of Pages 688
Title How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Allan Sikk
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00232.x
Volume 44
Issue 3
Pages 391-412
Publication European Journal of Political Research
ISSN 0304-4130, 1475-6765
Date 05/2005
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00232.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Measuring of party system stability in Eastern Europe during the first decade of democratic elections presents problems. The traditional quantitative measure – volatility – does not distinguish between the dynamics among incumbent parties and the rise of genuinely new ones. I propose a new additional measure – success of genuinely new parties – and compare it to volatility. The subsequent performance of initially successful genuinely new parties is analysed. While volatility has been remarkably high in East European countries, the genuinely new parties have, in general, not been very successful. Instability of party systems in the region stems rather from the inner dynamics of incumbent actors than from the rise of new contenders
Title Perceptions of political party corruption and voting behaviour in Poland
Type Journal Article
Author K. Slomczynski
Author G. Shabad
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068810393266
Volume 18
Issue 6
Pages 897-917
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688, 1460-3683
Date 2011-05-23
DOI 10.1177/1354068810393266
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Do perceptions of political party corruption play a significant role in vote choice? More specifically, is intention to vote for a specific party influenced by perceptions of corruption of that party, as well as by perceptions of the degree of corruption of competing parties? To determine whether perceptions of political party corruption matter at all for voters’ preferences, we propose a party choice model in which we estimate the influence of perceptions of corruption of each party, net of other variables, on vote intention. We focus on Poland, and use data from the Polish Panel survey, POLPAN, 1988-2008. Our analyses indicate that perceptions of political party corruption have an effect on the decision to participate in elections, on intention to vote for a particular party and on vote choice regardless of which party is chosen. Assessments of party malfeasance matter even when other determinants of the vote are considered.
Title Systemic Transformation and the Salience of Class Structure in East Central Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Kazimierz M. Słomczyński
Author Goldie Shabad
URL http://eep.sagepub.com/content/11/1/155
Volume 11
Issue 1
Pages 155-189
Publication East European Politics & Societies
ISSN 0888-3254, 1533-8371
Date 12/01/1996
Journal Abbr East European Politics and Societies
DOI 10.1177/0888325497011001005
Library Catalog eep.sagepub.com
Language en
Title Fluid Party Systems, Electoral Rules and Accountability of Legislators in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author K. M. Slomczynski
Author G. Shabad
Author J. Zielinski
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068807083824
Volume 14
Issue 1
Pages 91-112
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688
Date 2008-01-01
DOI 10.1177/1354068807083824
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Does the system of repeated parliamentary elections function as a mechanism of political control in new democracies with fluid party systems? Moreover, does electoral format affect the degree to which voters are able to hold legislators accountable for their performance in office? In addressing these questions, we use a new database on all legislative incumbents and all parliamentary elections that have taken place in Ukraine since 1994. Our findings indicate that, even in a flawed `electoralist’ democracy such as Ukraine, repeated parliamentary elections do serve as a mechanism of accountability with respect to economic performance. Disregarding electoral format, political control tends to work through political parties/partisan blocs. Only in the case of single-member district elections, however, is there a statistically significant relationship between economic performance and chances of winning, i.e. when economic performance is poor, voters punish legislators from a pro-presidential group and reward legislators from the opposition.
Title Term Limits and Electoral Accountability
Type Journal Article
Author Michael Smart
Author Daniel M. Sturm
Publication Jounral of Public Economics
Date In Press
Abstract Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters’ ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such “truthful” behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We characterize under what circumstances two-term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters.
Title Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians
Type Journal Article
Author James M. Snyder
Author Michael M. Ting
URL http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0047272707002101
Volume 92
Issue 3-4
Pages 482-500
Publication Journal of Public Economics
ISSN 00472727
Date 4/2008
DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.009
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition. In each period of the game, an interest group attempts to “buy” an incumbent’s policy choice, and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger. The voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance. The model predicts that “above average” incumbents face little discipline, but others are disciplined increasingly – and re-elected at a higher rate – as the interest group becomes more extreme. Extensions of the model consider term limits, long-lived groups, and multiple groups.
Title The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe
Type Book
Author Jadwiga Staniszkis
URL http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520072183
Library Catalog http://www.ucpress.edu
Abstract Understanding the dramatic political, social, and economic changes that have taken place in Poland in the mid-1980s is one key to predicting the future of the communist bloc. Jadwiga Staniszkis, an influential, internationally known expert on contemporary trends in Eastern Europe, provides an inside
Title Citizens as Representatives: Bridging the Democratic Theory Divides
Type Journal Article
Author Mark Stephan
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00178.x
Volume 32
Issue 1
Pages 118-135
Publication Politics & Policy
ISSN 15555623, 17471346
Date 03/2004
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00178.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Normative theory about the nature of democracy is divided into multiple perspectives. One way to bridge these divides is to address a related puzzle: making sense of the role of citizens who are directly involved in policymaking and policy implementation. Using Hanna Pitkin’s language of representation, I argue that active citizens can serve as “representatives,” and that such an understanding serves as an empirical link that bridges the normative divides between representative and direct democracy and between aggregative and deliberative forms of democracy. To illustrate this point, I include a description of citizen involvement in bureaucratic decision making. The example gives us insights into the appropriate role of citizen representatives and of the responsiveness of civil servants.
Title Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes
Type Journal Article
Author M. C. Stephenson
Author J. O. Nzelibe
URL http://jtp.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0951629809359037
Volume 22
Issue 2
Pages 139-167
Publication Journal of Theoretical Politics
ISSN 0951-6298, 1460-3667
Date 2010-04-16
DOI 10.1177/0951629809359037
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers by comparing three regimes: ‘Unilateral Authority’ (the President has exclusive decision-making power); ‘Mandatory Checks’ (the President cannot change policy without congressional assent); and ‘Opt-in Checks’ (the President may seek congressional authorization or act unilaterally). We find: (1) voters use asymmetric electoral rewards and punishments to offset the risk of politician bias, but voters rely less on this blunt instrument if there are internal checks; (2) adding a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change; and (3) voter welfare is highest under Opt-In Checks and lowest under Unilateral Authority.
Title Public Opinion and Market Reforms:: The Limits of Economic Voting
Type Journal Article
Author S. C. Stokes
URL http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0010414096029005001
Volume 29
Issue 5
Pages 499-519
Publication Comparative Political Studies
ISSN 0010-4140
Date 1996-10-01
DOI 10.1177/0010414096029005001
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract The broadly held view that promarket reforms are good for most people is in conflict with the equally broadly held view that, in democracies, reforms will generate widespread resistance. Resistance is expected because reforms typically produce economic downturns, at least over the short term. Under normal circumstances, we expect citizens to withdraw support from governments during periods of economic decline. If citizens withdraw support, then governments, worried about the next election, may abandon reforms. But our expectations should be different of new democracies pursuing promarket reforms. Citizens may believe governments when they claim that things have to get worse before they get better or that economic stagnation is the fault of the past model. Research in Poland, Peru, and Mexico, reported in this special issue, supports these expectations. Hence under democracy there is more scope for support of painful reforms than frequently acknowledged.
Title The Dynamics of Constituency: Electoral Control in the House
Type Journal Article
Author W. J. Stone
URL http://apr.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1532673X8000800402
Volume 8
Issue 4
Pages 399-424
Publication American Politics Research
ISSN 1532-673X
Date 1980-10-01
DOI 10.1177/1532673X8000800402
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This study offers a longitudinal analytic model designed to tap the degree to which members of the U.S. House of Representatives are responsive to constituency opinion in a dynamic sense. This, after all, is what constituency electoral control means: Regular elections are supposed to assure ongoing constituency control and force the representative to change his or her policy making behavior with changes in constituency opinion. The study employs roll call data and the University of Michigan national election survey series to show evidence of constituency electoral control when there is a decline in the margin of victory for the incumbent over time or when there is actual turnover. Under more normal conditions, however, and even when there is a visible source of change in constituency opinion (redistricting), there is little evidence of ongoing constituency control resulting in responsiveness.
Title Leviathan at bay: Constitutional versus political controls on government
Type Journal Article
Author Daniel Sutter
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01744.x
Volume 36
Issue 4
Pages 670-678
Publication Economic Inquiry
ISSN 00952583, 14657295
Date 10/1998
DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01744.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract I integrate constitutional constraints in a model of electoral control of politicians. Two types of politicians compete for office: angels, who never misuse power, and knaves, who abuse delegated power. Political theory suggests that constitutional constraints and elections are substitutes; I find a more complicated relationship. Elections sometimes substitute for constraints, while constraints complement and strengthen electoral controls based on politicians’ payoffs. Elections must work perfectly to generally allow constraints to be dispensed with. Knaves might self-select out of politics with constitutional constraints, which consequently appear inconsistent with the observed character of politicians. (JEL H1, D72).
Title Learning to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author Milan W. Svolik
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/ajps.12005
Volume 57
Issue 3
Pages 685-702
Publication American Journal of Political Science
ISSN 00925853
Date 07/2013
DOI 10.1111/ajps.12005
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article explains why dissatisfaction with the performance of individual politicians in new democracies often turns into disillusionment with democracy as a political system. The demands on elections as an instrument of political accountability are much greater in new than established democracies: politicians have yet to form reputations, a condition that facilitates the entry into politics of undesirable candidates who view this period as their one-time opportunity to get rich. After a repeatedly disappointing government performance, voters may rationally conclude that all politicians are crooks and stop discriminating among them, to which all politicians rationally respond by acting like crooks, even if most may be willing to perform well in office if given appropriate incentives. Such an expectation-driven failure of accountability, which I call the trap of pessimistic expectations, may precipitate the breakdown of democracy. Once politicians establish reputations for good performance, however, these act as barriers to the entry into politics of low-quality politicians. The resulting improvement in government performance reinforces voters’ belief that democracy can deliver accountability, a process that I associate with democratic consolidation. These arguments provide theoretical microfoundations for several prominent empirical associations between the economic performance of new democracies, public attitudes toward democracy, and democratic stability.
Title Theory of the democratic state
Type Book
Author Marie Taylor Collins Swabey
Publisher Harvard University Press
Date 1937
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 252
Title On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe
Type Journal Article
Author Margit Tavits
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00782.x
Volume 47
Issue 5
Pages 537-555
Publication European Journal of Political Research
ISSN 03044130, 14756765
Date 08/2008
DOI 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00782.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Electoral volatility is assumed to be a precursor to, or even an indicator of, party system instability. Such an assumption has strong implications for the underlying elite-mass electoral linkage and for the prospects of party system stabilisation in young democracies. This article demonstrates that electoral volatility follows from, rather than leads to, changes in the supply of parties. Thus, the choices of elites may be more responsible for instability in the early stages of party system development than the erratic behaviour of voters.
Title Learning to make votes count: The role of democratic experience
Type Journal Article
Author Margit Tavits
Author Taavi Annus
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379405000259
Volume 25
Issue 1
Pages 72-90
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date March 2006
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.02.003
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract This paper argues that strategic voting in young democracies increases as voters become more experienced with the functioning of democracy. This proposition is tested with election results from the democracies of Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union. The amount of wasted votes decreases with time, controlling for the number of lists running, the electoral system, the legal threshold, and the amount of votes for the leading list. The study contributes to the literature on strategic voting and democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe.
Title A House Divided: Party Strength and the Mandate Divide in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine
Type Journal Article
Author F. C. Thames
URL http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0010414004272526
Volume 38
Issue 3
Pages 282-303
Publication Comparative Political Studies
ISSN 0010-4140
Date 2005-04-01
DOI 10.1177/0010414004272526
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legislators in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legislators have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institutionalization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member legislature. Using roll-call voting data front the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legislature. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the most weakly institutionalized party system. the Russian Duma.
Title Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy
Type Journal Article
Author Jessica Trounstine
Volume 68
Issue 4
Pages 879 – 893
Publication Journal of Politics
ISSN 1468-2508
Date 2006
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00476.x
Abstract Theorists of democracy assert that government is held accountable and responsive to citizens through the electoral process. Elections can offer citizens representative government, but only when certain conditions are met. I provide evidence that when elections become uncompetitive for long periods of time and political coalitions establish dominant regimes the distribution of government benefits changes. Examining twentieth-century political patterns in nine of the United States’ largest cities, I find that dominant regimes establish electoral control, then target core supporters and powerful interests at the expense of the larger community.
Title The first decade of post-communist elections and voting: What have we studied, and how have we studied it?
Type Journal Article
Author Joshua A. Tucker
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/(…)
Volume 5
Issue 1
Pages 271-304
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 06/2002
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.100201.102917
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Taking account of institutional effects: How institutions mediate the effect of economic conditions on election results–evidence from Russia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990–1996
Type Conference Paper
Author Joshua A. Tucker
Place Washington, D.C.
Date 2000
Conference Name Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Title Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999
Type Book
Author Joshua A. Tucker
Publisher Cambridge University Press
ISBN 9780521672559
Date 2006-02-13
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract This book examines the effect of economic conditions on election results in five post-communist countries–Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic–in the first decade of post-communist elections. It is the first book length study of economic voting outside of established democracies, as well as one of the few comparative studies of voting in post-communist countries generally. The study relies on an original database composed of regional level economic, demographic, and electoral data, and the analysis features both broadly based comparative assessment of the findings across all twenty elections as well as more focused case study analyses.
# of Pages 458
Title Political control of the economy
Type Book
Author Edward R Tufte
Place Princeton, N.J.
Publisher Princeton University Press
ISBN 0691021805 9780691021805 0691075948 9780691075945
Date 1980
Library Catalog Open WorldCat
Language English
Title Parties and politics in post-1989 Poland
Type Book
Author Hubert Tworzecki
Publisher Westview Press
ISBN 9780813389776
Date 1996
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 232
Title Continuity and Rupture: The Power of Judgment in Democratic Representation
Type Journal Article
Author Nadia Urbinati
URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1351-0487.2005.00412.x
Volume 12
Issue 2
Pages 194-222
Publication Constellations
ISSN 1351-0487, 1467-8675
Date 06/2005
DOI 10.1111/j.1351-0487.2005.00412.x
Library Catalog CrossRef
Title Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy
Type Book
Author Nadia Urbinati
Publisher University of Chicago Press
ISBN 9780226842806
Date 2008-09-15
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract It is usually held that representative government is not strictly democratic, since it does not allow the people themselves to directly make decisions. But here, taking as her guide Thomas Paine’s subversive view that “Athens, by representation, would have surpassed her own democracy,” Nadia Urbinati challenges this accepted wisdom, arguing that political representation deserves to be regarded as a fully legitimate mode of democratic decision making—and not just a pragmatic second choice when direct democracy is not possible.As Urbinati shows, the idea that representation is incompatible with democracy stems from our modern concept of sovereignty, which identifies politics with a decision maker’s direct physical presence and the immediate act of the will. She goes on to contend that a democratic theory of representation can and should go beyond these identifications. Political representation, she demonstrates, is ultimately grounded in a continuum of influence and power created by political judgment, as well as the way presence through ideas and speech links society with representative institutions. Deftly integrating the ideas of such thinkers as Rousseau, Kant, Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Paine, and the Marquis de Condorcet with her own, Urbinati constructs a thought-provoking alternative vision of democracy.
# of Pages 341
Title Representation as Advocacy: A Study of Democratic Deliberation
Type Journal Article
Author Nadia Urbinati
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/192219
Volume 28
Issue 6
Pages 758-786
Publication Political Theory
Date 2000
Title The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory
Type Journal Article
Author Nadia Urbinati
Author Mark E. Warren
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/(…)
Volume 11
Issue 1
Pages 387-412
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 06/2008
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Democratic theorists have paid increasing attention to problems of political representation over the past two decades. Interest is driven by a a political landscape within which electoral representation now competes with new and informal kinds of representation; b interest in the fairness of electoral representation, particularly for minorities and women; c a renewed focus on political judgment within democratic theory; and d a new appreciation that participation and representation are complementary forms of citizenship. We review recent innovations within democratic theory, focusing especially on problems of fairness, constituency definition, deliberative political judgment, and new, nonelectoral forms of representation.
Title How Does Democratic Accountability Shape International Cooperation?
Type Journal Article
Author J. Urpelainen
URL http://cmp.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0738894211430278
Volume 29
Issue 1
Pages 28-55
Publication Conflict Management and Peace Science
ISSN 0738-8942, 1549-9219
Date 2012-02-15
DOI 10.1177/0738894211430278
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract In democratic societies, citizens can hold their government politically accountable for the consequences of international cooperation. Can democratic accountability shape international cooperation under strategic interdependence, and if so, to what effect? I show formally that citizens can endow a government with incentives to promote the public good by conditioning political support on the consequences of international cooperation. Contravening the conventional wisdom, democratic accountability effectively shapes international cooperation. Since international cooperation is reciprocal, domestic democratic accountability also influences the behavior of foreign governments, even if they are autocratic. Empirically, democratic accountability in one country increases the expected dyadic level of international cooperation if and only if the expected social benefits to that country are substantial enough. However, the analysis also reveals that democracies might sometimes obtain a higher payoff from cooperation with autocracies that do not have democratic accountability mechanisms. These findings indicate that the democratic propensity for international cooperation is a contingent phenomenon.
Title Measuring Electoral Control
Type Journal Article
Author Henk Van Der Kolk
URL http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1004888224540
Volume 34
Issue 4
Pages 367-378
Publication Quality and Quantity
Date 2000-11-01
DOI 10.1023/A:1004888224540
Abstract If voters do not pay attention to whatrepresentatives do, representatives are not stimulatedto be responsive. Therefore, electoral control, theextent to which voters base their vote on thebehaviour of representatives is, at least potentially,an important variable in the explanation of thebehaviour of representatives. Moreover, electoralcontrol seems to be an important variable from anormative point of view. In this article four ways tomeasure the minimal level of local electoral controlusing the outcomes of local elections (electoralstatistics) are presented. The general idea behind themeasures is fairly simple. If local elections arecompletely determined by nonlocal factors, then thelosses and gains of local divisions of nationalparties from one local election to another are`identical’ across municipalities. A deviation fromthis pattern can be interpreted as an indication ofthe minimal level of local electoral control in aspecific municipality. The measures are externallyvalidated using data from a survey among council members.
Title The New Science of Politics: An Introduction
Type Book
Author Eric Voegelin
Publisher University of Chicago Press
ISBN 9780226189970
Date 2012-10-12
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 212
Title Democracy and Association
Type Book
Author Mark E. Warren
Publisher Princeton University Press
ISBN 0691050775
Date 2001
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 280
Title National and European?: Polish Political Elite in Comparative Perspective
Type Book
Author Włodzimierz Wesołowski
Author Kazimierz M. Słomczyński
Author Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow
Publisher IFiS publishers
ISBN 9788376830285
Date 2010
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 217
Title Political cleavages and post-communist politics
Type Journal Article
Author Stephen Whitefield
URL http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/(…)
Volume 5
Issue 1
Pages 181-200
Publication Annual Review of Political Science
ISSN 1094-2939, 1545-1577
Date 06/2002
DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112601.144242
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Considerable attention has been paid over the past decade to political cleavages in post-communist Eastern Europe. Investigators have attempted to establish whether such cleavages exist, to map their character, and to explain their formation theoretically. Research initially focused on whether communist rule had created distinctive forms of cleavage in the region as a whole, or indeed obliterated social capacity to form any structured social or ideological divisions. The results of this work, however, have tended to support a more differentiated and less sui generis understanding in which the character of cleavages varies considerably across the region. Debate has turned to accounting for the formation and variation in cleavages by reference to factors such as long-standing cultural legacies, forms of communist rule and modes of transition from it, the effects of social structure and individual social experience in the post-communist period, and the impact of institutions and party strategies.
Title Cross-national analyses of economic voting
Type Journal Article
Author Guy D. Whitten
Author Harvey D. Palmer
URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379498000432
Volume 18
Issue 1
Pages 49-67
Publication Electoral Studies
ISSN 0261-3794
Date March 1999
Journal Abbr Electoral Studies
DOI 10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00043-2
Library Catalog ScienceDirect
Abstract The present paper replicates and extends Powell and Whitten’s study of comparative economic voting (Powell, G. Bingham and Whitten, Guy D. (1993) A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science37, 391–414). We extend Powell and Whitten’s research in three ways. First, we have developed a theoretically more appealing method for dividing our cases according to the clarity of government responsibility. Second, we consider whether the electoral effect of economic growth varies with government composition, with large coalitions focusing on the consensual goal of improving economic growth. Third, 40 new cases have been added to the original 102 analyzed by Powell and Whitten. Using a more appropriate methodology and an expanded data set, we find strong confirmation of the results presented in Powell and Whitten’s study. We also find evidence that supports our theory about coalition governments and economic growth.
Title Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation
Type Book
Author Melissa S. Williams
Publisher Princeton University Press
ISBN 0691057389
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
Abstract Does fair political representation for historically disadvantaged groups require their presence in legislative bodies? The intuition that women are best represented by women, and African-Americans by other African-Americans, has deep historical roots. Yet the conception of fair representation that prevails in American political culture and jurisprudence–what Melissa Williams calls “liberal representation”–concludes that the social identity of legislative representatives does not bear on their quality as representatives. Liberal representation’s slogan, “one person, one vote,” concludes that the outcome of the electoral and legislative process is fair, whatever it happens to be, so long as no voter is systematically excluded. Challenging this notion, Williams maintains that fair representation is powerfully affected by the identity of legislators and whether some of them are actually members of the historically marginalized groups that are most in need of protection in our society. Williams argues first that the distinctive voice of these groups should be audible within the legislative process. Second, she holds that the self-representation of these groups is necessary to sustain their trust in democratic institutions. The memory of state-sponsored discrimination against these groups, together with ongoing patterns of inequality along group lines, provides both a reason to recognize group claims and a way of distinguishing stronger from weaker claims. The book closes by proposing institutions that can secure fair representation for marginalized groups without compromising principles of democratic freedom and equality.
# of Pages 348
Title Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking
Type Journal Article
Author Brandice Wrone
Author Michael Herron
Author Kenneth Shotts
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669237
Volume 45
Issue 3
Pages 532-550
Publication American Journal of Political Science
Date 2001
Library Catalog CiteULike
Abstract We develop an informational theory that analyzes conditions under which a reelection-seeking executive will act in the public interest. The theory considers factors such as executive competence, challenger quality, and the likelihood that voters will learn the consequences of policy decisions before an upcoming election. We find that an executive who has information suggesting that a popular policy is contrary to voters’ interests may or may not pander to voters by choosing it; under certain conditions, the executive can actually increase his probability of reelection by choosing an unpopular policy that is in the public interest. However, we also show that an executive will sometimes face electoral incentives to enact a policy that is both unpopular and contrary to voters’ interests. Our theory is illustrated with examples involving President Abraham Lincoln, California Governor Earl Warren, and President Gerald Ford.
Title The Place of `Party’ in Post-Communist Europe
Type Journal Article
Author M. Wyman
Author S. White
Author B. Miller
Author P. Heywood
URL http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1354068895001004006
Volume 1
Issue 4
Pages 535-548
Publication Party Politics
ISSN 1354-0688
Date 1995-10-01
DOI 10.1177/1354068895001004006
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract Using data from a survey of almost 6000 voters in five post-communist countries (Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic) designed by the authors and carried out in November and December 1993, the authors review evidence about citizens’ formal commitment to parties compared with other forms of civic activity; about depth of trust in political parties; the effectiveness of action through political parties; desirable forms of party competition; and the depth of party identification in post-communist Europe. They conclude that while the degree of hostility to political parties remains significant, and identification remains low in comparative perspective, in none of the countries is there a desire among mass publics to see an end to party competition, and the place of party is in any event secured by elite consensus.
Title Inclusion and Democracy
Type Book
Author Iris Marion Young
Publisher Oxford University Press, Incorporated
ISBN 9780198297543
Date 2000
Library Catalog Google Books
Language en
# of Pages 328
Title Translating Social Cleavages into Party Systems: The Significance of New Democracies
Type Journal Article
Author Jakub Zielinski
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100019079
Volume 54
Issue 02
Pages 184-211
Publication World Politics
ISSN 0043-8871, 1086-3338
Date 2011-6-13
DOI 10.1353/wp.2002.0005
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract This article focuses on new democracies in Eastern Europe and addresses two questions about the translation of social cleavages into political oppositions. The first question concerns the translation of preexisting cleavages: does the evolution of new party systems influence the politicization of social conflicts? The second question concerns the translation of new social cleavages, that is, cleavages that emerge once a party system freezes: can a new social cleavage be politicized? To answer these questions, the article integrates a formalization of social cleavage theory with a game-theoretic model of a new party system. The first result is that translation of preexisting cleavages depends on which parties survive the early rounds of electoral competition, In fact, depending on which parties survive, the axis of political conflict can shift by 90 degrees. This implies that party systems in new democracies should be seen as important founding moments, during which political actors determine the long-term aces of political conflict. The second result is that once a party system freezes, the politicization of a new social cleavage is difficult. Indeed, it is possible that a new social cleavage will remain politically dormant. In the context of Eastern Europe, this result suggests that political salience of class conflict is likely to be low because competitive elections and political parties predate the entrenchment of property-owning classes.
Title Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems
Type Journal Article
Author Jakub Zielinski
Author Kazimierz M. Slomczynski
Author Goldie Shabad
URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100018177
Volume 57
Issue 03
Pages 365-395
Publication World Politics
ISSN 0043-8871, 1086-3338
Date 2011-6-13
DOI 10.1353/wp.2006.0006
Library Catalog CrossRef
Abstract How do fluid party systems that exist in many new democracies affect democratic accountability? To address this question, the authors analyze a new database of all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in Poland since 1991. They find that when district-level economic outcomes are bad, voters in that country punish legislators from a governing party and reward legislators from an opposition party. As a result, electoral control in Poland works through political parties just as it does in mature democracies. However, the authors also find that, in contrast to mature democracies, legislators from a governing party tend to switch to an opposition party when the economy in their district deteriorates. When they do so, their chances of reelection are better than those of politicians who remained loyal to governing parties and are no worse than those of incumbents who ran as opposition party loyalists. These empirical results suggest that while elections in new democracies function as a mechanism of political control, fluid party systems undermine the extent to which elections promote democratic accountability.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s